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CONFIDENTIAL

13 July 1943

MEMORANDUM TO: General Magruder
FROM: The Director

I have your memorandum of 7 July 1943 in relation to clandestine intelligence in Africa. I agree with your suggestion, but I hope that in directing the conference that there is kept in mind the constant danger we will have of being thrown out, not only from France, but from Africa. For that reason I am sure that it will be impossible to do the work we are doing now in Africa by use of the existing system.

WD

CONFIDENTIAL

[Handwritten signatures and initials]

Director's Office

OSS Form 1034

(3308)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

7 July 1945

12.886
Int. Sec. Div.
Africa Hall.
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x P.Y. Project

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL DONOVAN:

SUBJECT: Clandestine Intelligence in Africa.

Reference is made to Mr. Murphy's memorandum of 6 July, 1945, Subject: X-2 Africa.

After a long period of discussions held between SI and X-2 under the chairmanship of this office, an agreed plan was formulated and submitted for your approval on 12 June. The scope of this plan was made contingent upon budgetary limitations. In reference to the plan you stated on 19 June:

"I agree with the principle stated but it is essential that it be stated simply and carefully and based on quality rather than numbers. The present group must be reduced and the budget brought down into proportions with the rest of our task."

Requests for modifying proposals from the two branches were made by this office. A meeting was finally held on 3 July, at which SI presented a specific plan as a tentative proposal for the liquidation of a large part of its operations. X-2 produced no specific proposals, and it was then agreed that, after consultation with Mr. Murphy they should present their proposals in order to effect an economic coverage of Africa for OSS as a whole within our budgetary possibilities.

I know of no way, other than cooperative planning, by which the best interests of OSS can be served. Such planning necessitates that the two branches confer until a solution can be negotiated or until your intervention is absolutely required.

An agreed solution to this problem is quite possible if sought in a cooperative spirit.

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- 2 -

I therefore recommend that no action be taken by you on Mr. Murphy's memorandum of 6 July, and that the matter be referred to this office for further study and discussion by representatives of both branches, looking toward an agreed solution.

John Magruder
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

cc: Mr. Sheperdson

Mr. Murphy

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6 July 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL DONOVANFROM: J. R. Murphy
Chief X-2 Branch

SUBJECT: X-2 Africa

1. On 13 June 1945 a plan for S.I.-X-2 operations in Africa was prepared and submitted to you through General Magruder. That plan contemplated the operation of fifteen stations. Four of the stations (Tangier, Dakar, Lorenzo Marques and Aden) were to be manned exclusively by X-2 personnel and eight exclusively by S.I. (Oran, Tunis, Monrovia, Lagos, Leopoldville, Luanda, Nairobi, Addis Ababa). Three other stations were to have both X-2 and S.I. personnel (Algiers, Casablanca and Pretoria). The total estimated budget under the plan was \$527,865. The plan has never had your formal approval.

2. Since the preparation of the above plan drastic reductions have been made in the overall OSS budget and in the anticipated budgets of S.I. and X-2 respectively. These reductions necessitate a completely new approach and new planning for all X-2 areas of operation and require considerable revision of plans and expenditures for Africa.

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3. We feel that the barest requirements for security intelligence in African areas justify X-2 in maintaining coverage at three points which are now, and may become increasingly important from the security point of view. Those points are Tangier, Casablanca and Algiers. Our plan would be to place military personnel in those stations, either in or out of uniform, the salaries of whom would not be chargeable to the OSS budget. One secretary at each place, plus small allowances for expenses and payment of agents we estimate would cost \$20,000 to \$25,000 annually.

4. If S.I. should feel that it is not justified in maintaining its own representatives at those places, the X-2 personnel, operating alone, will supply all intelligence required by OSS.

5. It is felt that the situation has so changed since the joint plan of operation was proposed that joint operations would not be justified under existing conditions. It had been hoped to achieve the complete intelligence coverage of all of Africa. As this would have involved representation at many points where neither positive nor counter-intelligence opportunities were great enough to warrant separate operations, joint activity was indicated. The changing situation is now such that this Branch can provide locally for representation

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at only those three points at which the present interest is fruitful enough to yield the richest results. Even at these points operations must be carried on at the minimum level of expenditure consistent with efficiency. This Branch is not able to assume any part of the expense of underwriting the far more expensive positive secret intelligence activities. Under these conditions it would seem more efficient and satisfactory for each Branch to assume full responsibility for its own operations in the field and achieve coordination by proper exchange of views and material in Washington. It would seem administratively burdensome and probably more expensive for the two Branches to attempt to operate jointly the few stations involved.

6. It is recommended that no further effort be made at this time to operate under the proposed joint plan.

cc: General Magruder
Mr. Shepardson

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General Magruder

General Donovan

Plan for Intelligence Operations in Africa attached to
13 June memorandum for General Donovan

I agree with the principle stated, but it is
essential that it be stated simply and unequivocally, not based on
quality rather than numbers. The present group must be
reduced and the budget brought down into proportion with the
rest of our task.

WJD

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

*I agree with the principle
but it is essential
that it be stable simply and
completely and based on quality within*

13 June 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HONOVAN

SUBJECT: Plan for Intelligence
Operations in Africa.

*The present plan must be
budgetary and the
into projection with the
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In accordance with your instructions there is sub-
mitted herewith a plan for intelligence operations in Africa
which has been prepared under the supervision of this office
by the Africa divisions of SI and X-2 and agreed to by
Mr. Shepardon and Mr. Murphy.

This whole subject has been gone into at considerable
length and many points have been thrashed out which it is
hoped will result in cooperative effort on the part of both
of the branches.

It is realized that in view of overall demands and
the budgetary limitations that this whole project cannot be
carried through at this time. However the principles having
been established, the project can be reduced by the necessary
selectivity in the stations to be operated.

John Magruder
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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
12 June 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MAGRUDER

SUBJECT: Plan for Intelligence Operations in Africa.

Attached hereto is a plan for the future development of a secret intelligence service throughout the Continent of Africa.

This has been prepared by the Africa Divisions of SI and X-2 and has been approved by Mr. Sheperdson and Mr. Murphy.


Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

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SECRET**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

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I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.

To prepare plans for the future development of the secret intelligence service throughout the Continent of Africa.

II. DEFINITIONS.

For the purposes of this plan, the following definitions are established:

1. Africa includes all of the Continent and the islands adjacent thereto, excepting Egypt, the Mediterranean Islands and the Azores Islands. The Aden Protectorate will be included.

2. The mission of SI will be to develop secret intelligence by espionage means.

3. The mission of X-2 will be to develop secret intelligence by counter espionage means.

III. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.

1. Africa is an important factor in world affairs, potentially even more so than at present. Its size is three times that of the United States. It consists of 42 political units, only 3 of which are self-governing, the remainder being connected by ties of varying degree to England, France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, and Italy. Of a total population of 153 million, only 4 million are white and another 4 million Arabs and Indians. These 8 million non-Negroes are principally in South Africa and along the Mediterranean, with less than one million whites scattered in the vast areas between. There are only 3 cities south of the North Africa littoral with a white population in excess of 100,000, and all are in the Union of South Africa. Dakar is the only city between North Africa and the Union with a white population of 20,000. Elsewhere, a large city is composed of only two or three thousand whites with up to 100,000 natives.

2. With its agglomeration of dependencies, Africa is a reflector of the economic, political and strategic interests of the larger powers. It initiates little; it is the field of results. Fundamental changes may be reflected here as the emerging world powers struggle to reorient themselves to their advantage. The old pattern in Africa is changing. In the

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- 2 -

unfolding world picture, no large power can afford to be indifferent to the strategic position of Africa with its relatively untapped resources, materials, and manpower.

3. Communications and travel, except in South Africa and the Mediterranean area, are exceedingly limited. Facilities in the interior consist of motor travel, a few river boat routes, and a network of inter-colony air routes. The rail transportation is very inadequate. The economic life of Africa consists mainly of producing raw materials; the principal occupations being farming, mining, and trading. A beginning of heavy industry in South Africa has been a development of the war. Few American concerns or individuals are engaged in business in Africa, and even fewer have permanent establishments. As a result, American Consular offices are generally small and sparsely distributed.

4. It is evident from the foregoing that this is an exceedingly difficult area in which to conduct secret intelligence activities. An American arriving in a locality is apt to be the subject of curiosity, if not of actual suspicion. The Colonial powers are extremely jealous of their territorial rights in Africa, and due to limited communications and transportation and to the smallness of the white population, they are able to exercise close control of foreigners. Consequently, for secret intelligence operations, only one or two Americans can be introduced into any particular locality, and they must have convincing cover reasons for their presence.

IV. DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM.

1. Because of the necessity for maintaining readily available pouch and cable communications with Washington, and because of the difficulty of establishing satisfactory cover, it will be necessary to have an OSS representative with State Department status in each key communication center. By arrangement with the State Department, each person so placed should be a member of the Foreign Service Reserve, and should to all intents and purposes perform the duties of the position, receive its amenities, and assume its responsibilities. In order to preserve cover, compensation for services should be by regular consular procedure.

2. This officer will serve as the channel of communication between Washington and his area, and will be the official representative of OSS to the Chief of the Foreign Service Mission. However, this need not mean that he will be the principal OSS operative in the area, since the principal operative will often be under complete outside cover.

3. The number of persons who can be stationed in Africa will be limited by the willingness of the State Department to grant positions in their missions, the difficulty of recruiting and training adequate personnel, and the scope of the work to be accomplished. Moreover, the development of secret intelligence

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- 3 -

by positive means and by counter espionage means will overlap more and more in future operations, and will tend to follow more closely the same pattern.

4. In order, therefore, to simplify and at the same time improve the work of OSS in Africa, SI and X-2 have agreed to a combined plan of operations. A careful analysis (Tab "A") was made to determine those areas which should be covered by OSS, and the State Department post in each where it would be most advantageous to station a representative. Each area was studied to ascertain whether the positive or counter espionage interest or type of operation predominates, in order that a representative of the Branch most directly concerned should be designated to the Foreign Service Mission. When an SI representative is selected, he will be thoroughly trained by X-2 prior to his departure for the field, and, similarly, when an X-2 representative is selected, SI will give him thorough training.

5. In order to approach complete intelligence coverage of Africa under present conditions it will be necessary to have OSS representatives assigned to fifteen State Department Missions located throughout the Continent. Each will require the services of a confidential secretary, who will be an American and trained by OSS. In each of these areas an undercover agent will be established where required and where conditions permit.

The State Department Missions to which OSS representatives should be assigned are:

Casablanca	Dakar	Pretoria
Tangier	Monrovia	Lourenco Marques
Oran	Lagos	Nairobi
Algiers	Leopoldville	Addis Ababa
Tunis	Luanda	Aden

For details on the present and past status of OSS representation at these posts, see Tab "B".

6. Algiers, Casablanca, and Pretoria, because of their size and the importance of the areas in which they are located, will require the assignment of representatives from both SI and X-2.

7. Tangier, Dakar, Lourenco Marques, and Aden are posts covering areas where counter espionage is of primary interest. Therefore, members of X-2 should be assigned as the OSS representative in the American missions in those cities. Oran, Tunis, Monrovia, Lagos, Leopoldville, Luanda, Nairobi and Addis Ababa are posts covering areas where positive intelligence is of primary interest. Therefore, members of SI should be assigned as OSS representatives in the American missions in those cities.

8. All cables and pouch material between Africa and Washington will be available automatically to both SI and X-2.

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However, dissemination or use of information will remain the responsibility of the individual Branch, depending on the content of the material. Each Branch will communicate with a representative of the other only after clearance with the other Branch. The right of each Branch to communicate directly with its representative is not prejudiced by this arrangement.

9. All administrative and personnel problems will be arranged between the Branches. Duplicate files will be established except those pertaining to strict undercover personnel. The development of all operational plans will be undertaken jointly by SI and X-2 prior to their being presented to the Director via the Board of Review.

10. From actual experience in the field over a period of three years, the estimated average yearly cost of an Africa field station is \$35,191 (Tab "GN"). Therefore, the total estimated maximum cost for the entire Africa project of fifteen fully operating stations will amount to \$527,865 per year.

11. It is agreed that the representatives of the Africa Desks of the two branches will maintain constant close co-operation and coordination. Any issues arising not determinable by the Branch representatives or their chiefs will be submitted through the Deputy Director, Intelligence Service, for decision.

V. CONCLUSIONS.

The development of a secret intelligence service throughout Africa as set forth in this plan is practicable and desirable, and should immediately be put into effect to the extent permitted by budgetary considerations. The proposed cooperation between SI and X-2 should materially increase the efficiency of the plan, and decrease the personnel required and the funds necessary to conduct the operation.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS.

It is recommended that the plan as outlined herein be submitted to the Director for his approval.

Charles H. [Signature]
Chief, SI Branch

[Signature]
Chief, X-2 Branch

15 June 1945

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SECRETAnalysis of Intelligence Coverage Needed in Africa

This analysis of comparative importance of positive and counter intelligence is predicated on the activities and interests of enemy German and Italian intelligence systems in Africa for the past three years. If the target of counter intelligence should be revised to include, let us say, British or French or Russian systems, the comparative importance of the two phases of American secret intelligence would naturally have to be revised.

(The OSS representatives and secretaries here referred to do not include undercover agents, sub agents or informants.)

I. DAKAR - French West Africa

A. Consulate General: opportunity for 1 OSS representative and secretary, only.

B. Strategic Importance:

1. Capital of the 8 French West African Colonies.
2. The point in Africa nearest to the Western Hemisphere, overlooking South Atlantic shipping routes.
3. French naval and air base.
4. Of importance as transportation and commercial center.

C. Intelligence Requirements

Both positive and counter intelligence are of equal importance.

II. MONROVIA - Liberia

A. Legation: opportunity for 2 OSS representatives and 1 secretary.

B. Strategic Importance

1. Seat of the government of one of the United Nations.
2. For the past 100 years under the nominal protection of the United States.
3. Location of port being built under the supervision of the U.S. Navy.
4. The largest American commercial enterprise in Africa (the Firestone Company).
5. Extremely complex diplomatic, political and economic situation.
6. A potential air transportation base of major importance for the United States.

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C. Intelligence Requirements

Preponderantly positive intelligence; by reason of the major American interests the counter intelligence field should be adequately covered.

III. LAGOS - Nigeria

A. Consulate: opportunity for 1 OSS representative and secretary, only. (U.S. Consulate at Accra, Gold Coast, need not be covered).

B. Strategic Importance

1. Capital of Nigeria; the most important of the 4 British West African dependencies, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast and Nigeria, and of the 2 British West African Mandates, Togo and Cameroons. (Class B)
2. A listening post for British commercial policy on the West Coast of Africa and also for the French Cameroons, Dahomey, French Mandate of Togo, (Class B) Fernando Po (Spanish) and Rio Muni (Spanish).
3. Center of the most articulate, numerous and developed native population in West Africa.

C. Intelligence Requirements

Positive intelligence only.

IV. LEOPOLDVILLE - Belgian Congo

A. Consulate General: opportunity for 1 OSS representative and secretary, only.

B. Strategic Importance

1. Seat of government of the semi-autonomous Belgian Congo with complete freedom of access and communications to Brazzaville, where there is also a U.S. Consulate that need not be covered, and southern French Equatorial Africa.
2. Most important as a source of minerals vital to all industrialized countries.
3. Potentially one of the greatest sources of water-power.
4. Location of the tightest cartel control anywhere in the world at present.

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5. A large native population, a segment of which is technologically trained.
6. Strategically placed in the center of the continent with great leanings toward industrial cooperation with South Africa.
7. A potential market of great importance to the United States.

C. Intelligence Requirements

Preponderantly positive intelligence with an important counter intelligence job to be done entirely undercover.

V. LUANDA - Angola

- A. Consulate: opportunity for 1 OSS representative and secretary, only.

B. Strategic Importance

1. As one of the principal colonies of Portugal, a listening post for Portuguese colonial trends.
2. A potential market of considerable importance to the United States.
3. A potential base for U.S. air activity.
4. A factor in the realignment of the political trends in the southern half of Africa.

C. Intelligence Requirements

Positive intelligence is the principal interest. Because of a reasonably large remnant German Colony it is of potential counter intelligence importance.

VI. PRETORIA - Union of South Africa

- A. Legation and 4 Consulates: 2 or more OSS representatives and secretaries.

B. Strategic Importance

1. Seat of the government of one of the United Nations
2. The most progressive and powerful territory in Africa with economic and political aspirations toward neighboring colonies.
3. The Afrikaaner element is a source of major political danger to the structure of the British

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Empire and by reason of Smuts' extreme age unpredictable beyond his present tenure of office.

4. Trustee of a Mandate (Class C) South West Africa.
5. The greatest market for American manufactured goods in Africa.

C. Intelligence Requirements

Both positive and counter intelligence fields are of equal importance in this area and both should be adequately represented.

VII. LOURENCO MARQUES - Portuguese East Africa

- A. Consulate General and Consulate (at Beira): opportunity for 1 OSS representative and secretary, only.

B. Strategic Importance

1. Its ports feed Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and also the rich industrial areas of South Africa.
2. The richest and most populous Portuguese Colony.
3. Once a major center of counterespionage.
4. A listening post for Portuguese colonial trends.
5. A potential base for American air activity.
6. By reason of its being the principal port of entry for the industrialized areas of South Africa, it has been and is coveted by that country.

C. Intelligence Requirements

Principally positive intelligence; large remnant German population should be watched from counter-intelligence point of view.

VIII. NAIROBI - Kenya Colony

- A. Consulate General and a Consulate: opportunity for 1 OSS representative and secretary, only.

B. Strategic Importance

1. Administrative center for British East Africa Bloc.

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2. Uganda, the most progressive and highly educated native population.
3. Tanganyika, a Class-B Mandate including a large East Indian population.
4. Kenya, the most conservative of British African territories.
5. A potential market for American manufactured goods.

C. Intelligence Requirements

Positive Intelligence only.

IX. ADDIS ABABA - Ethiopia

- A. Legation and a Consulate (Aden): opportunity for 2 OSS representatives and secretaries.

B. Strategic Importance

1. Seat of Government of one of the United Nations.
2. Although without a coast line, its geographical position controls the outlet of the Red Sea.
3. A source of extreme political discord with British, Italian and French Governments.
4. A potential base for American commercial air activity.
5. A listening post for the neighboring territories belonging to European powers.
6. Unproved natural resources of potential strategic importance.

C. Intelligence Requirements

Positive intelligence of paramount importance; by reason of a large remnant Italian population the counter intelligence field should be adequately covered.

X. CAIRO - Egypt

- A. Legation and three Consulates: opportunity for 2 or more OSS representatives and secretary.

B. Strategic Importance

(Operating base for penetration of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Cyrenaica. Liaison with OSS NETO and U.S. War Department AMET)

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1. Cyrenaica, former Italian Colony now point of dispute between the British, French, Egyptians and Italians.
2. Center of the Senussi element of the Arab world.
3. A potential source of oil.
4. Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, a point of continuous conflict and discord between British and Egyptian Government.
5. Transportation center for either East-West or North-South travel.

C. Intelligence Requirements

1. For Cyrenaica both positive and counter intelligence are necessary.
2. For Anglo-Egyptian Sudan positive intelligence only.

XI. TUNIS - Tunisia

A. Consulate: opportunity for 1 OSS representative and secretary, only.

B. Strategic Importance

1. As capital of Tunisia of outstanding importance from political and commercial viewpoint.
2. The focal point of French-Italian dissidence.
3. A major Air Transport Command air base.
4. Center of Moslem unrest and political activity.
5. Operating base for undercover penetration of Tripoli, former Italian Colony.

C. Intelligence Requirements

Positive and counter intelligence in equal importance.

XII. ALGERIA - Algeria

A. Consulate General: opportunity for 1 OSS representative and secretary, only.

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SECRET**B. Strategic Importance**

1. Seat of Governor General of Algeria and headquarters of the French Administration; a department of the French Metropole.
2. Leading trade and industrial center not only for Algeria but for all French North Africa.
3. A center of Moslem political activity and unrest.
4. Shipping and transportation center of outstanding importance.

C. Intelligence Requirements

Positive and counter intelligence in equal importance.

XXII. ORAN - Algeria

- A. Consulate: opportunity for 1 OSS representative and secretary, only.

B. Strategic Importance

1. Second leading industrial and commercial center of Algeria and second largest passenger port of entry.
2. French naval base.
3. Major center of Spanish influence in French North Africa.
4. Important center of native Nationalists movements.
5. The center of the conservative political thought expressed through the Colons.

C. Intelligence Requirements

Positive intelligence of primary importance.

XIV. TANGIER - International Zone

- A. 1 Legation and 1 Consulate (in Spanish Morocco):
opportunity for 2 or more OSS representatives and secretaries.

B. Strategic Importance

1. International zone of political importance to all European powers, at present under the dominance of the Spanish government.
2. Center of political intrigue and espionage.

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3. Provides opportunity for loosely supervised investments of Axis capital.
4. Official Seat of the Sheriffian Government in Spanish Morocco adjacent to Tangiers.
5. Of outstanding military and naval significance due to its location on the Strait of Gibraltar.
6. Point of transit for people of various nationalities entering or leaving North Africa.

C. Intelligence Requirements

Principally counter intelligence with a strong political positive intelligence function.

XV. CASABLANCA - French Morocco

- A. Consulate General and a Consulate (Rabat): opportunity for U.S. representatives and secretaries.**

B. Strategic Importance

1. Chief port and largest city of Morocco.
2. Business center for commercial transactions with cities in the interior.
3. Important transportation center for both railroad and international air travel throughout Morocco.
4. Air Transport Command air base.
5. By reason of the Convention of Madrid and the Act of Algeiras the U.S. Government has through the "capitulatory rights" unique privileges in the Protectorate of Morocco.
6. Centers of major political and cultural activity are located in Fez and Marrakech.
7. Rabat is the central point of administration for the Sheriffian Empire and the seat of the Resident General of French Morocco; a listening post for the French political activity.

C. Intelligence requirements

Positive and counter intelligence of equal importance.

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Additional Communication Outlets

Consulates exist in Madagascar, the Canary Islands and Madeira which should be considered in any overall program. None of these areas is of sufficient importance to incorporate into present planning.

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**PRESENT AND PAST STATUS OF OSS REPRESENTATION
AT THE 16 POSTS PROPOSED FOR AFRICA**

CASABLANCA. SI representative attached to Consulate at present.
also SI open office with X-2 clerical personnel attached at present.

TANGIER. SI and X-2 representatives attached to Legation at present.

ORAN. SI representative attached to Consulate at present. Also SI open office at present.

ALGAIERS. X-2 representative attached to Consulate formerly. SI undercover personnel at present.

TUNIS. SI representative attached to Consulate at present. Also SI undercover personnel at present.

DAKAR. SI representatives attached to Naval Mission formerly. No OSS personnel at present.

MONROVIA. SI undercover personnel at present.

LAGOS. SI representative attached to Consulate formerly; moved to Accra as SI open office at present; this is to be abandoned and reestablished at Consulate in Lagos. SI undercover personnel at Bolama at present and formerly at Abidjan. SI open personnel formerly at Freetown and Bathurst.

LEOPOLDVILLE. SI representative attached to Consulate formerly. SI clerical personnel and undercover personnel at present.

LUANDA. SI representative attached to Consulate at present, also SI undercover personnel at present.

PRETORIA-CAPETOWN. SI representative attached to Legation formerly. SI undercover personnel at present.

LOURENCO MARQUES. SI undercover personnel at present.

NAIROBI. SI undercover personnel at present.

ADDIS ABABA. SI representative attached to Legation at present. SI undercover personnel at present.

ADEN. No OSS representative to date.

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SECRET**ESTIMATED COST OF AVERAGE AFRICA FIELD STATION PER ANNUM**

1 Representative with Consulate	Salary	\$5,629	
	Living Allowance	2,800	\$ 7,829
1 Confidential Secretary	Salary	2,433	
	Living Allowance	1,500	3,933
1 Undercover Agent	Salary	5,629	
	Living Allowance	2,800	7,829
3 Sub-Agents	Part time remuneration		<u>3,800</u>
TOTAL SALARIES OF OPERATIVES			\$23,191

Travel: 2 Trans-Atlantic round trips (including per diem)	\$5,000	
Local Travel	1,800	\$ 4,800
Purchase of Information		5,000
Cables and other Communications		1,000
Equipment and Supplies (including depreciation, i.e., Automobile)		<u>1,500</u>
TOTAL PER STATION		\$36,191

**ESTIMATED COST OF 15 AFRICA FIELD STATIONS
PER ANNUM.****\$527,865****SECRET**

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TO: DIRECTOR, D.I. Bureau
FROM: Special Funds Branch
SUBJECT: Special Funds Branch 1964-1965
FOR THE BOARD OF REVIEW

Attached hereto is a copy of the
recommendation of the Board of Review on
the above subject.

This recommendation has been
approved by the Director.

For the Board of Review:

R. H. Giddard

R. H. I. Giddard
Member

Attachment
Jin
cc: Special Funds Branch
Director's Office

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Chief of Review
 Attention: Commander J.S. Morgan, Asst.
 Executive Office

Request for Fiscal Year 1944 - 1945 for Africa
 Division, C.I.

There is returned herewith the original of your memorandum of 20 September to the Director together with your file and the opinion of the General Counsel on the above subject.

You will note that I have indicated the approval of the Director at his direction on the face of your memorandum.

E. J. Putzell Jr.
 Lieutenant (j.g.), USN
 Asst. Executive Officer

Attachments

CC: Secretariat
 General Counsel

Tr. C. D. [Signature]

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1. DEL. SULLOWAY
2. DIRECTOR

IN let memo 9/20 JMW:cm
to let re budget for fiscal
year 1948 for Atlantic Div.
E. H.

No legal objection to approval
of such a budget.

John N. Patsell

cc: Lt. Patsell

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Office of Operations Services

Washington, D. C.

22 September 1944

Dr

The Director

Budget for Fiscal Year 1944 - 1945 for Africa Division, A.I.

S.I. Branch has submitted to the Board of Review the budget covering the African projects for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1945. The original of S.I. Branch's memorandum is attached hereto.

The Board has discussed the memorandum with Lt. Baker and Capt. Bacon of the Africa Division, A.I. In this discussion the Board pointed out that it was not possible to present any recommendation covering a budget beyond the end of the present fiscal year and Lt. Baker stated that S.I. had not clearly understood the Board's request for information. This recommendation applies only to S.I.'s Africa budget for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1945.

The discussion further developed the fact that S.I. has understood that the covering plan, PG 77/B, was approved by the JCS on 6 June 1944. However, the Board presumes that PG 77/B is authorized under the terms of JCS Directive 100/12/B, dated 29 October 1943.

It is evident to the Board of Review that this activity is one that was started some time ago and, according to Lt. Baker's statement, has established itself as a source of material for G-2, State Department and FMA for material they cannot get through their own channels. It would seem to provide an organization that has produced and can continue to produce material of value to G-2 as well as to services mentioned above, whose facilities in the area in question are said to be limited.

In its memorandum of 18 September 1944, S.I. requests the appropriation of \$600,000 for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1945. The Board recommends the appropriation of this sum from the funds to cover the subject operation for the whole fiscal year beginning 1 July 1944. Any amounts spent during the first 6 months of the current fiscal year should be charged against the total.

The Board approves as a recommendation the suggestion contained in the last paragraph of the S.I. Branch memorandum. It is further requested that all future expenses be charged against the over-all plan of PG 77/B under which the present non-operational pattern than the individual projects is followed PG 77/B. This will provide the required

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IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THE
INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN, IT IS
TO BE KEPT SECRET AND NOT DISCLOSED TO ANY OTHER
PERSON OR ORGANIZATION WITHOUT THE EXPRESS WRITTEN
AUTHORIZATION OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.

FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

[Signature]

J. S. Hoffman
Commander, USAF
Headquarters

10-10-60
JAH

SECRET

Dear John

I attach a
report of the Board
of Review concerning
our ~~organization~~ for the
Africa Division. I
trust you would look
into this. It looks
much like a continuation
of SA under a new
name. I think one
that the entire project is
not well considered
& that the personnel is
either in need of or
not well chosen.

SECRET

General Magruder, John D. O'Connell

11 October 1964

Brig. General Wm. J. Donovan

Board of Review Recommendations

I have been looking over the recommendation of the Board of Review that \$620,000 be approved to cover Project 77/2, Africa S.I.

I think we should examine this whole question in view of the situation in South Africa.

W.J.D.

SECRET

SECRETOFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

10 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR General Donovan
SUBJECT: Attached Paper

1. I have investigated this matter at some length and discussed it with the Branches. I have had Colonel Sands question the various users of the positive information being obtained, including MIS, R&A, and State. Various values, generally favorable, are attached to the information, and all users recommend retention of the service.

2. I have discussed with interested parties the question of formal collaboration in Africa between X-2 and SI.

3. Attached are two memoranda prepared for me by Colonel Sands.

Recommendations.

1. That the SI activities mentioned in the basic paper be continued, and that the budget for the fiscal year 1945 (July 1, 1944 - June 30, 1945) be authorized.

2. That all formal arrangements whereby SI and X-2 in Africa act jointly be cancelled.

3. That paragraph 1c, PG 77/2, be deleted. This paragraph reads as follows:

"By arrangement with X-2, SI Washington has assumed responsibility for counter-espionage activities in all of Africa."

John Magruder
John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS - Intelligence Service

SECRET

SECRET**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES****WASHINGTON, D. C.**

9 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MAGRUDER:**SUBJECT: African Division SI.**

1. The material collected by the African Division SI is disseminated within OSS to R&A and X-2, and outside of OSS to MIS, DNI, A-2, FEA, and State Department.

2. An Analysis of the evaluation of material disseminated by the African Division SI discloses the following:

(a) Approximately 25% of the material received is of primary interest to X-2. However, a statement of the value of this material, from the X-2 standpoint, has not been secured at this time.

(b) Copies of all intelligence received are disseminated to R&A. An analysis of the value of this material, as reported by Sherman Kent after conference with his division, shows that it is definitely of value, and in some cases -- namely, Union of South Africa and Belgian Congo -- superior in quality.

(c) MIS has classified 45.2% of the material received between May 1943 and August 1944 as definitely valuable. This is in comparison with an over-all average for OSS of 41.8%.

(d) Evaluations by DNI were confined to 15% of all material considered of interest. For the period 17 August 1944-8 September 1944, 67.5% was classified as definitely valuable.

(e) Very few reports have been evaluated by A-2, but approximately 15% have been considered valuable.

(f) The FEA has evaluated very little of this material, but has expressed high regard for it.

(g) The State Department and FEA are by far the two largest users of this material. While they have not been formally evaluating it, a number of opinions have been secured

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
SECRET

regarding its value to the Department. Harry Villiard, Chief of the African Division, states that the material has proven of some value and should be continued. He believes that that derived from French Morocco has been of the most value. William Lewis, Assistant Chief of the African Division, who is leaving shortly for a post at Casablanca, states that the material has been of great value in his work, especially the R&A basic studies and the R&A weekly reports. He hopes that OSS will continue to supply information on Africa in the future as it has in the past. Perry Jester of the African Division was most enthusiastic in his praise of OSS, stating that he found the material of the greatest assistance and in many cases invaluable. Tom Wasson, who is responsible for the French colonies in Africa, stated that he believed the material from OSS to be of great value to his work, as it often covered groups of people and opinions which could not be touched by the ordinary State Department channels.

3. It would appear, from the necessarily somewhat hasty investigation made of the value of the material produced by the African Division SI, that this material is generally considered valuable, and that any decrease in it would be regretted. The State Department is undoubtedly finding the work of OSS of value, especially that which is produced by R&A. One of the main considerations in determining whether or not the African Division SI should be continued, should be the value which R&A places on the SI material.

4. It would further appear that the potential value of the African Division SI depends to a large extent upon the future attitude taken by the United States Government, and especially the Department of State, toward Africa. This opinion is held not only by those members of the African Division of the Department of State with whom I discussed this matter, but also by Lt. Col. Schmidt, Acting Chief of the African Division SI. Schmidt stated that his branch was ready, willing and able to carry on with a secret intelligence organization throughout Africa, but that to do so he must be given a mission to perform by those responsible agencies of the Government which would be interested in the material secured.

Which for him is
high praise.


Oliver Jackson Sands, Jr., Lt. Col.
Acting Assistant Deputy Director, OSS
Intelligence Service

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7 October 1944

TO: The Director
SUBJECT: Replenishment of Mission Funds for
Dr. Jack S. Harvin, Protestant.

Under date of 28 September 1944, the
Board of Review recommended that \$500,000 be
approved to cover Project 77/2, Action S.I.
Pending the Director's action thereon, the
Board recommends approval of \$25,000 to re-
plenish Dr. Harvin's Mission Funds. This corres-
pondence is attached.

28. Dublin, S.I., advises that Dr. Harvin's
activities will be chargeable to Project 77/2 when
and if it is approved by the Director.

For the Board of Review:

R. H. I. Goddard

R. H. I. Goddard
Member

Attachment
AD/JIN

10/21/44 15
No legal objection before
the whole record.
J. M. J. J.

SECRET

SECRET**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES****WASHINGTON, D. C.**

5 October 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MAGRUDIR**SUBJECT: African Operations of SI.****1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.**

In considering the proposed budget of \$630,000 for the African Division SI for 1944-1945, the Director has requested that it be looked into, and has commented that "it looks more like a continuation of SX under a new name. It strikes me that the entire project is not well considered or that the personnel is either in hard luck or not well chosen."

2. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.

The North African area was transferred to the African Division SI in March 1944, and was handled jointly with X-2 until the recent termination of the SX program by the Director. At the moment, a program for the Mediterranean area, including North Africa, is under consideration by the Planning Group. However, it is estimated that the SI expenses in North Africa will average about \$2500 per month for each operational station.

That program which is primarily involved in the proposed budget is PO 77/2. This program was approved by the Director on 14 June 1944, and is a combination of seven projects which had been approved previously and were already in operation under the jurisdiction of the African Division SI. The area included covers continental Africa and the islands adjacent thereto, with the exception of those areas which are under the jurisdiction of Algiers and Cairo. This is the original area for which the African Division SI was established, and that in which it has operated from its inception.

SI is the only branch of OSS which operates in Africa south of the Sahara, and, at the specific request of X-2, agreed in July 1943 to assume the responsibility for X-2 work in that area. A memorandum was drawn 8 July 1943 by the

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Chief of SI and approved by the Chief of X-2, outlining the manner in which this coordination of functions was to be achieved.

This agreement was continued in Paragraph 1.c. of PG 77/2, which states that: "By arrangement with X-2, SI/ Washington has assumed responsibility for counter-espionage activities in Africa." (By definition, Africa refers only to the area south of the Sahara.) A draft of this program was submitted to X-2 by the D.D.I.S., and was approved by the Acting Chief X-2, with certain minor corrections, on 29 May 1944.

3. DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM.

This program is not a continuation of the SX project, as it is primarily concerned with a different area from that for which SX was designed. Moreover, it is not a new project, but the continuation of one which was in operation some time prior to the conception of SX.

Lt. Col. Schmidt, Acting Chief of the African Division SI, has outlined the present operations of his division and its plans for the future. These seem to be well thought out and ably presented. He states that his division has co-operated completely with X-2, and has turned over to that branch a large amount of counter-espionage information. Col. Schmidt has complete confidence in the 25 members of his division now in Africa, and ~~Major~~ Bonner, whose unfortunate conduct necessitated his recently being recalled, is leaving the OSS. Counter-espionage activities of SI in Africa have not been criticized by X-2, until instruction was received from the Director that they were to be stopped in the ~~British colonies~~. *Union of South Africa.*

Mr. Murphy states that SI has caused considerable trouble in Africa by meddling in counter-espionage, and he feels very strongly that X-2 and SI will never be able to work on such matters jointly, because it is only possible for professionally trained CE personnel to engage in CE operations. Moreover, it is necessary that CE operators be controlled and report directly to a CE organization. To do otherwise is very dangerous. The major portion of the intelligence derived from Africa is of a CE nature, and is turned over to X-2 by SI, but is of no value to X-2 as it is obtained by X-2 from better sources. At present, X-2 does not have any

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- 3 -

personnel in this area, and does not contemplate having any in the immediate future, because it is an area of such low priority in so far as the war is concerned. Mr. Murphy added that he had never seen PG 77/2, and could never agree to the provisions of Paragraph 1.c., which arrangement he felt sure had never been made. He said also, that he did not believe that he had ever discussed this conflict of opinion with the Deputy Director Intelligence, but had several times with the Director.

4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a) Since it is apparent that now that the X-2 Branch has been in operation for a while it is anxious to sever all possible connections with its parent branch, SI, and since it is also apparent that X-2 does not feel that it can train SI operators sufficiently to be of use to it in its operation, it is recommended that the Planning Group be asked to reexamine PG 77/2 with the view of eliminating Paragraph 1.c..

b) Since X-2 does not intend to develop the African area at this time, and since SI has already in operation an intelligence program throughout the entire area and is furnishing increasingly valuable information to OSS, it is recommended that the budget as submitted be approved.

c) Since it is evident that there are just differences of opinion between SI and X-2 as to the value and as to the danger of operations in this section of Africa, it is further recommended that the Deputy Director Intelligence call a meeting immediately of the responsible officers of SI and X-2 interested in this area, for a thorough discussion of the subject.


Oliver Jackson Banda, Jr.
Lieutenant Colonel, F. A.

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

5 October 1944

SECRET

To: Director, OSS
Via Board of Review

From: Africa Division, SI

Subject: Replenishment of Mission Funds
to Dr. Jack S. Harris, Pretoria

1. By his cable #111 (In 21904), Dr. Jack S. Harris has requested that we dispatch to him an additional \$5,000 to replenish his operating funds.

2. The last accounting rendered by Dr. Harris was for the seven month period beginning 1 December 1943 and ending 30 June 1944. The total of his expenditures during this period was \$9,948.79. This would indicate an approximate expenditure of \$1,500 per month. His balance as of 30 June 1944 was \$6,671.07.

3. This would indicate expenditures from 1 July to 30 September of approximately \$4,500 which would reduce his present operating fund to roughly \$2,000. Dr. Harris is requesting an additional \$5,000 at this time in order that his operating funds be kept at a comfortable working level. It is requested that the request of Dr. Harris for an additional \$5,000 be approved and that the

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funds be dispatched by cable through State Department channels in the usual manner.

A. W. Schmidt

A. W. Schmidt
Lt. Col., AUS
Acting Divisional Deputy

Approved:

[Signature]
John E. O'Hara
Acting Chief, SI

SECRET

SECRET

Mr. O'Garra

18 September 1966

Executive Office

Attached is copy of number 2164 (IN-50104) from
Caserta.

General Donovan does not believe the instructions
to close down should apply to Casablanca or Tunis and
he wants to look into the matter to see as soon as
concerned.

Will you please consider the matter and prepare
a reply to this cable which should be submitted with
your recommendations.

Robert Thurn
Lt. (j.g.) USN
Assistant to the
Executive Officer

SECRET

Form of (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE

September 18, 1944

FROM

CAIERTA, ITALY

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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IN 80106

FOR ACTION

FOR INFORMATION

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT, MEMO

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-57945-1

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#9184. Glavin to Donovan.

Cassidy states that he understood you to mean that our closing down in Algiers rapidly approaching completion would also include Casablanca, Oran, and Tunis. Before making recommendations on disposition of personnel in those 3 places, may we have your confirmation that that is your intention.

(Handwritten: 1100 10/1 22.14 to Glavin 9/20)

*(Handwritten: 7/10/44
1st Lt. ...
...
...)*

SECRET

RECORDED: 9/23/44 8:44 PM

FILE COPY

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO REPRODUCE THIS CABLE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

(Handwritten: A copy of this cable has been sent to Mr. Clegg for his information. It has been submitted to the General. Cg.)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE

September 20, 1964

REC'D

9/22/64

5:14 PM

TO

RABBIT, STATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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1584

DISTRIBUTION

CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR

FOR INFORMATION

DIRECTION

SECRETARIAT, STATE

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER**SECRET**

#9714. 109 to Glavin.

Personnel and activities at Casablanca, Tunisia and Iran should remain unchanged after closing in Algeria. Reports will be directly to Washington through consular channels that have been arranged. Your #8164 is answered by this.

SECRET

TOD: 9/22/64 5:125 PM

FEB AUG JBO

FILE

INITIALS OF PREPARING OFFICER

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Form 87 (Rev. 10-1-44)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE September 22, 1944

FROM CASERTA, ITALY

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

IN 20187

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT.

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER**SECRET**

#3524. Blatin to Donovan.

Accompanied by Colonel Fink, Mr. Boulton arrived from Algiers today having completed survey of Tangiers, Oran, Casablanca, and Algiers and he has seen Springs from Tunis. He will inform you of his views, in which we concur, principal points of which are (1) Change over to new personnel will be effected after varying periods dependant upon current incumbent and location. (2) This view has been discussed informally and with the yardman's concurrence with American Consulate concerned who have indicated their approval of such a program, subject to State Department request. (3) These views at State Department request will be informally conveyed to State by Boulton. Marchillo Boulton states his visit confirms in his opinion principal points covered in plan now in Washington prepared for General Smith on about 5th September.

Our recommendations are that responsibility for and authority to conduct all OSS activities in North Africa pass from our (FSD) earliest possible date to Washington control directly. Marchillo, since Smith at Algiers has completed his plans for evacuation of Algiers and clean down of operations from that area due to removal of 885th Heavy Bombardment Squadron to Italy permit completion of move from North Africa to Italy, we feel that Colonel Fink should join our Staff here at Caserta for further assignment. We will discuss this with 154 now enroute here and will include examination of proposed assignment for Fink in Switzerland. Our recommendations will be sent to you.

TOM 9/22/44 1:35 P.M.

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SECRET

REPORT AND RECORD

REPORT NO.

DATE

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1. Report should be numbered to correspond with number in 7a column.
2. Will be done across sheet under each comment.
3. Initials should be used in 7a column.
4. User should initial index card irrefragably before further editing.
5. Copies of index card should be indicated in Comments column.
6. Report should always be returned to identity.
7. No exceptions and separate sheet.

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director,

DATE: 20 September 1944

FROM : Acting Chief, SI,

SUBJECT: Closing of North Africa Offices (Lt. Thrun's Memorandum of 10 September) (Offices at Tunis, Casablanca and Oran)

1. The opinion of this Branch, concurred in by X-8, is that the offices should remain open until after undercover offices are established in the Consulates.

2. Arrangements are progressing to establish such offices, in keeping with the exchange of correspondence between you and Under-Secretary Berle.

3. These offices are needed to provide coverage in the interim.

4. It is considered essential that the new representatives under consular cover, have the benefit of personnel, orientation and documentation that the present representatives can offer.

5. This should apply in Oran as well as in the two other locations.

6. If you concur, the attached cable is recommended.

John G. O'Carra
John G. O'Carra
Acting Chief, SI

John G. O'Carra

The Director,

Acting Chief, ST,

Chief of State Affairs Division (ST), State Department
10 September (office in State, Department and State)

In the opinion of this Bureau, necessary in the
is that the offices should remain open until after
undercover offices are established in the Republic.

2. Arrangements are progressing to establish
such offices, in keeping with the exchange of correspondence
between you and Under-Secretary Berlin.

3. These offices are needed to provide coverage in
the interim.

4. It is considered essential that the new representatives
given under consular cover, have the benefit of personnel
orientation and documentation that the present representatives
are given.

5. This should apply in form as well as in the
other locations.

6. If you require, the attached cable is recommended.

John H. Johnson
Acting Chief, ST

FROM:

CABLE

Again Air SI

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No.

Date Rec'd SA

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	Fwd'd.		
1. <i>Chief SI</i>				<i>W</i>	
2. <i>House</i> <i>Department</i>					
3. <i>Trust</i>					
4.					
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6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10. <i>Cable Desk</i>					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.

A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.

Officer Designations should be used in To column.

Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.

Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.

Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.

For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

SECRET

(747)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

AIR DISPATCH

FROM: Lt. H.J. Pittsall Jr.
 TO: Colonel Jirvin, Unsera
 NUMBER: 0015

DATE: 8 September 1944
 OUT: 17537

EXTENDED DISSEMINATION
 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

DO NOT FILL IN - FOR USE OF MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

DIRECTOR

DISPATCHER

SECRET

Enclosed is copy of note to Boulton who will shortly be
 in your theater.

In view of nature of documents which he has asked to have
 forwarded for him, believe it important that the request
 contained in Leslie's memorandum be followed carefully by Boulton
 while in the field.

5X

7:11 9/14/44 - 7101 PH

THE COPY

INITIALS CAN BE USED ONLY

SECRET

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

中華民國二十九年
 五月二十五日
 行政院會議通過
 財政部呈請
 查照在案

SECRET

1. The first group of people who are not allowed to enter the country are those who are on the "no-fly" list. This list is maintained by the Department of Homeland Security and includes individuals who are suspected of being involved in terrorism or other activities that could threaten the security of the United States.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

100

[illegible][illegible]

100-443887-100

[illegible]

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

1. IS FORWARDED TO EACH OF THE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD
OF THE ALL-AMERICAN UNION OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

REF ID: A644

OFFICE, LONDON

PRECEDENCE

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

CLASSIFICATION

CLASSIFICATION

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, INFORMATION, SIGNALS, ETC., ETC.

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SECRET

REF. 134 FROM MEMO.

WE HAVE JUST COMPLETED TERMINATING BY ARRANGEMENT AND INSTRUCTION
 ORDERED TO ACT ACCORDINGLY. WE ARE THEREFORE PROCEEDING IMMEDIATELY
 WITH THE NORTH AFRICA PLANS UNTIL DOULTON HAS LEAVED
 AS WE CAN MEET YOU AND GET FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS
 YOUR SCHEDULE ON THIS MEETING CAN BE ARRANGED.

SECRET

8/4/44 1057 PM

INITIALS: RB, HCP, JEN.

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 WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE

August 23, 1944

FROM

OASSTIA

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

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IN-X HISC

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAN, SI, X-9, MAGRUDER

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SECRET

#33. Imhoven to Chaston.

I have had a meeting with Burton and Magruder and talked to Chapman alone. Will you inform Boulton that present plan of UK is not working out and will be discontinued as branches involved may not accordingly.

*Secretariat will cancel
general order
in tabling 3 X -
4972.*

TOM: 12/16/44 7:00 p.m.

SECRET

FILE COPY

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654 Form No. 1006

TOP SECRET

SIGNATURE RECORD SHEET

To be prepared by each TSCO upon receipt of a TOP SECRET document

Description		Registry	
Source: <i>Panbell</i>		Accession No: <i>DSTS 169</i>	
Addressee to: <i>Tracy - PPAH</i>		Accession date: <i>8/26/47</i>	
Document date: <i>8/26</i>		Office or Branch: <i>Director</i>	
Document No: <i>4 STCA</i>	Copy No: <i>3</i>	Logged by: <i>L.A. 170</i>	
No. of pages: <i>1</i>	Attachments:		

ATTENTION:

The TSCO named below is responsible for the attached TOP SECRET document while it is charged to this Office or Branch. On receipt of this document from another TSCO he must prepare this form on which, according to TOP SECRET regulations, each person who sees the document or to whom its contents are communicated, must sign, with the date and time received, and initial with the date and time of release in the spaces provided opposite his name. This document may be shown only to persons authorized to see TOP SECRET documents, and who are required to know the information which it contains. Each person formally charged with the safekeeping of this document by the TSCO in his Branch or Office is responsible for and must return the document to the TSCO before further routing.

The attached document was received from the _____, Courier Receipt No. _____
(branch or office)

REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		
	NAME	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	INITIALS	DATE
1.	TSCO					
2.		<i>W. D. ...</i>	<i>8/26</i>			
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13.	TSCO					

As soon as the officials concerned have read this document, the TSCO must sign on line 13, detach this sheet from the document and retain it as a permanent record in his files. He must then deliver the document by Officer Courier to the next TSCO listed on the routing sheet attached to this document.

The attached document was released to the _____, Courier Receipt No. _____
(branch or office)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Mr. Harlan
Major Field
Executive Office

25 August 1944

The Department of State has given formal approval for the placing of one OSI representative at each of the following consulates: Algiers, Oran, Tunis and Casablanca. Further word will be forthcoming from the Department with respect to the consulates at Rabat and Mauritania which will be closed before long.

I have been instructed by the Acting Director to request that you submit your joint recommendation with respect to the type of personnel which this organization should use in filling these four positions.

E. J. Putrell Jr.
Lieutenant (jg), USN
Assistant Executive Officer

TOP SECRET

086 Form #131

Date 11/21/44

To: Mr. Cheston

Consideration will doubtless
have to be given to the allocation
of the four slots referred to be-
tween the S1 and X-2 Branches.

E. J. Putzell Jr.
E. J. Putzell Jr.

V - 3
Office of the Executive Officer

(10449)

GSS FORM 8001a

Date

To: ~~Mr. Charles Chapman~~

A copy of the attached letter
 from Mr. Biddle has been sent to
 Mr. Boulton who is already familiar
 with this matter

JWA
 J. W. Monningloss
 1st Lt. JAGP

I understood that Major Gump
 was interested in the
 assignment of personnel to
 these posts - JWA

TOP SECRET

(9130)

To be prepared by each TSCC upon receipt of a TOP SECRET document.

1970-1971

1. The person named below is responsible for the attached TOP SECRET document while it is located in this Office or Branch. On receipt of this document from another TSO he must prepare this form on which, according to TOP SECRET regulations, each person to whom the document or its contents are communicated, must sign with the date and time received, and initial with the date and time of release in the spaces provided opposite his name. This document may be shown only to persons authorized to see TOP SECRET documents, and who are required to know the information which it contains. Each person formally charged with the safekeeping of this document by the TSO in his Branch or Office is responsible for and must return the document to the TSO before further routing.

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As soon as the officials concerned have read this document, the TSOO must sign on this sheet and return the sheet from the document and retain it as a permanent record in his files. He must then deliver the document by Officer Courier to the next TSOO in line on the same floating sheet attached to this document.

The affected document was released to the branch or office, Courier Receipt No.

TOP SECRET

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

... ..

TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 23, 1944

In reply refer to
A-B/II

TOP SECRET

My dear General Donovan:

Your letter of July 13, 1944, regarding the program for OSS activities in French controlled territory in North Africa has been receiving our attention.

I am glad to state, as Mr. Boulton of your office has been telephonically advised, that formal approval has been obtained for OSS representatives to be placed in the Consulates at Algiers, Oran, Tunis, and Casablanca.

We are awaiting a telegraphic reply from our Consulate at Dakar before giving a decision on that post. As regarding Rabat, we are in some doubt because consideration is being given to the closing of that office. We will not want to make a decision until Mr. Charles W. Lewis, Jr., now in the Department and to be named Consul at Casablanca, reaches his post and gives us his opinion. There is also a possibility that the office at Oran will be closed before long. You may be sure, however, that we shall continue to give sympathetic consideration to your request.

I am pleased that Fletcher Warren has been of assistance to OSS.

Cordially and sincerely yours,

Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
Assistant Secretary

Brigadier General William J. Donovan,
Director, Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.



C. C. Boulton

14 JUL 1964

William A. Smith
Assistant Secretary
Department of State

My dear Mr. Carlson

General Diego de Leon of the 28 March 1964, in which a copy is attached, sets forth a program of activities to be carried out in Spanish Morocco through the cooperation of the State Department. This program has been completed with two exceptions. The Assistant Secretary at Tangier also is serving as Vice Consul at Ceuta; the Vice Consul at Melilla has been recruited and is being trained but will not reach his post until late next month.

It has been desirable to carry out a similar program in French controlled territory in North Africa. Therefore it is requested that Mr. Fletcher be authorized to work out, with OSS staff members, a program under which OSS representatives will be placed in some of the states of Algeria, India, Iran, Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and at other convenient places established in the same territory may be expected.

I have a most gratifying report of Mr. Harman's cooperation in the matter of Spanish Moroccan territory and wish to take this opportunity of thanking you for it.

Sincerely yours,

William A. Smith
Director

Attachment

22 March 1944

Mr. Joseph A. Davis
 Assistant Secretary
 Department of State

SECRET

See Mr. Davis

I have recently discussed with Mr. Hoover and Mr. E. A. Tamm the Department's progress of OGB activities which it is hoped can be put into effect in Tangier and Spanish Morocco. Mr. Raymond Hamilton has continued discussion with Mr. Fletcher Warren and they have tentatively agreed on the following specific program.

1. MELILLA: If it becomes necessary for the Department to send Mr. Fletcher Warren to Melilla, to send Mr. Fletcher Warren to Melilla, the Department will send to Melilla a career foreign service man of the grade of junior consul to replace Mr. Fletcher Warren. His departure, this man would be available to OGB for active indoctrination in the OGB problem in Spanish Morocco, in the field of handling OGB organizations, and the special requirements of security that are involved.

2. MELILLA: The OGB will furnish to the Department a suitable man who would be appointed as a non-career vice consul to work with and under the general supervision of either Mr. Fletcher Warren or his successor at Melilla. He would be primarily responsible to OGB for his activities, directives and recommendations. He, of course, would be under the immediate supervision of the Consul.

3. ORAN: The Department to send a career or non-career vice consul who before his departure would be available for complete indoctrination and training. This man would be the vice consular office agent and would be responsible to the State Department and OGB. He would, of course, be responsible to the Charge d'Affaires at Tangier in respect to consular duties and to the OGB man at Tangier for his OGB activities.

4. TANIER: The OGB will furnish a suitable man who would be appointed Assistant Petroleum Attaché at Tangier to the Department. Mr. Richard Hamilton, who also is an OGB man, will be primarily responsible to OGB for his extra-consular activities but under the general jurisdiction of the Charge d'Affaires at Tangier.

15 July 1944

To: Director of OSS
 From: Chief of S.I.
 Subject: SX

1. **Conception:** Basically, the SX plan was to combine secret intelligence and counter-espionage activities in the North African territory, and to gather long-range intelligence that it was inexpedient for the existing OSS organization to gather under its Theatre (Allied) control. The same organization, personnel and facilities were to be used for both S.I. and C.E. work. The plan was evolved in the fall of 1943, and set forth in a memorandum to you dated November 26, 1943, approved by Buxton, Magruder, McDenough, Boulton, Wanvig and myself.

2. Territory was Algeria, Tunisia, French and Spanish Morocco, Tangier, Rio de Oro, Ifni, French West Africa.

3. The original plan envisaged three successive phases of operation. The first was to continue during the present OSS-Theatre arrangement, with SX administered through OSS Mission headquarters. The second was to take place when Mission headquarters was withdrawn from Algiers,

SECRET

- 2 -

with SX maintaining its own headquarters in North Africa. The third was to begin when territory ceased to be a part of the Military Theatre, with SX representatives reporting directly to Washington.

4. This program was transmitted to Col. Glavin for compliance on December 14, 1943. Col. Wavne was sent to take charge of SX in Africa, arriving about March 1. At a meeting on March 27, 1944, between Col. Glavin and Washington officials, including Magruder, Murphy, Pierson, Boulton and myself, it was made evident that phase one and phase two of the program could not be carried out, in view of certain basic requirements laid down by the Theatre.

5. On May 12, 1944, you approved an SX budget of \$100,000 for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1944.

6. As a result of the meeting in March, phase three, alone, of the program, has been put into effect with personnel reporting directly to Washington and sending information copies of reports to Algiers when appropriate.

7. Representatives are at Tangier, Ceuta, Melilla, Oren and Casablanca.

8. Oren and Tangier have been very productive despite

SECRET

- 5 -

representatives being without help. Additional help has been sent to Tangier; is being recruited for Oran.

9. Operations at Casablanca have been unsatisfactory and have produced little information except that gathered through French sources and records. A shake-up made in the office last month relieved the head of the office and the principal agent. Better results may be expected now.

10. Spanish Morocco: Every evidence exists that this is the center of German activity in North Africa with the greatest concentration and most Spanish help at Tetuan and Melilla. This territory now is set up in strict compliance with phase three of the SX Program. One representative working alone at Tangier, has organized a good net-work that has been productive of much valuable information. Indicative of this work is in a comprehensive expose of German undercover activities at Melilla. 41 of 57 pieces of information presented were drawn, wholly or in large measure, from OSS sources, although document was O.N.I.'s. The addition of assistance for the representative and the manning of posts at Melilla and Ceuta has put us on a very sound basis for thorough coverage.

SECRET

- 4 -

11. Department of State cooperation: Cover in Spanish Morocco and pouch and cable facilities between SX representatives and between them and OSS Washington, are provided by the State Department. State Department officials, especially those having immediate jurisdiction, are highly satisfied with results in Spanish Morocco and seem entirely willing to cooperate in extending facilities to other territories.

12. Using Spanish Morocco as a pattern, the following action is being taken:

a. Arrangements are being made with State Department for Consulate coverage at key points in Algiers and French Morocco to provide representatives at those points as rapidly as they can be recruited.

b. Tight commercial cover will be used whenever the opportunity arises, to supplement coverage under "a".

c. The present setup in French territory will be used to gather all information possible from existing French files so we may have dossiers


SECRET

- 5 -

to be retained if our overt operations cease.

d. The SX undercover organization should be divorced to the greatest possible extent from all open OSS activities. Under the present arrangement there is far too much contact between known and undercover personnel. It is believed that as the permanent undercover organization is developed, knowledge of it should be restricted to one or, at most, two persons in the Theatre, and that these should refrain from direct contact or direct communication with undercover personnel.

13. The attached letter to Assistant Secretary of State Herle will expedite and formalize new cover requirements. Its signature is requested.


Whitney H. Shepardson

Attachment

SECRET

1. Directing of the
2. Under of the
3. The

1. The original intention of the plan was to
achieve complete intelligence and security in the
territories in the North African territory, and to achieve
in a way a intelligence that it was independent of the
external and organization to achieve under the (AT) control. The same organization, government and
the plan was to be used for both U.S. and U.K. work.
The plan was evolved in the fall of 1948, and set forth
in a memorandum to you dated November 29, 1948, approved
by Tamm, MacFarland, Robinson, Boulton, Harvig and myself.

2. Territory was Algeria, Tunisia, French and Spanish
Morocco, Tunisia, Rio de Oro, Mali, French West Africa.

3. The original plan envisaged three successive
phases of operation. The first was to continue during
the present Anglo-French agreement, with AT administered
by the U.S. Mission headquarters. The second was to take
place when Mission headquarters was withdrawn from Algeria.

SECRET

with SI activities; the new intelligence in North Africa. The third was to begin when services, seemed to be a part of the Military Theater, with SI representatives reporting directly to Washington.

4. This program was transmitted to Col. Glavin for compliance on December 16, 1943. Col. Glavin was sent to take charge of SI in Africa, arriving about March 1. At a meeting on March 27, 1944, between Col. Glavin and Washington officials, including Magruder, Murphy, Pierce, Houston and myself, it was made evident that phase one and phase two of the program could not be carried out, in view of certain basic requirements laid down by the Theater.

5. On May 12, 1944, you approved an SI budget of \$100,000 for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1944.

6. As a result of the meeting in March, phase three, alone, of the program, has been put into effect with personnel reporting directly to Washington and sending information copies of reports to Algiers when appropriate.

7. Representatives are at Timgia, Gata, Melilla, Oran and Casablanca.

8. Oran and Timgia have been very productive despite

SECRET

representatives being without help. Additional help is being sent to Tangier in order to control for Spain.

9. Operations at Melilla have been unproductive and have produced little information except that gathered through French sources and records. A change made in the office last month relieved the head of the office and the principal agent. Better results may be expected now.

10. Spanish Morocco: Every evidence exists that this is the center of German activity in North Africa with the greatest concentration and most Spanish help at the town of Melilla. This territory now is set up in strict compliance with phase three of the SX Program. One representative working alone at Tangier, has organized a good network that has been productive of much valuable information. Indicative of this work is in a comprehensive report of German undercover activities at Melilla. 41 of 57 pieces of information presented were drawn, wholly or in large measure, from 123 sources, although document was C.I.L. #8. The addition of assistance for the representative and the opening of posts at Melilla and Ceuta has put us on a very sound basis for thorough coverage.

SECRET

11. Department of State recognizes there is Spanish interest and power and active facilities between its representatives and between them and our facilities, as provided by the House Department. State Department officials, especially those having knowledge of the situation, are highly satisfied with results in Spanish interest and even entirely willing to cooperate in extensive facilities in other territories.

12. Using Spanish interest as a pattern, the following action is being taken:

a. Arrangements are being made with State Department for immediate coverage at key points in Algeria and French Morocco to provide representatives at those points as rapidly as they can be recruited.

b. First commercial cover will be used whenever the opportunity arises, to supplement coverage under "a".

c. The present setup in French territory will be used to gather all information possible from existing French files so we may have accurate

SECRET

一、政治思想：政治立场坚定，拥护党的路线方针政策，具有强烈的政治责任感和使命感。

[illegible]

1. 凡在本行工作的干部，其家属如有违法犯罪行为，经查明属实者，本行有权取消其家属在本行的福利，并视情节轻重给予相应的处分。

The Long Run Supplement

SECRET

1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

Honorable Adolph L. Berle
Assistant Secretary
Department of State

My Dear Mr. Berle:

General Huguette's letter of the 23 March 1944, of which a copy is attached, sets forth a program of activities to be carried out in Spanish Morocco through the cooperation of the State Department. This program has been completed with two exceptions: The Assistant Petroleum Attache at Tangier also is serving as Vice Consul at Oujda; the Vice Consul at Melilla has been recruited and is being trained but will not reach his post until late next month.

It now seems desirable to carry out a similar program in French controlled territory in North Africa. Therefore it is requested that Mr. Fletcher Warren be authorized to work out, with OSS staff members, a program under which OSS representatives will be placed in consulates of Algiers, Oran, Tunis, Casablanca and Marseilles, and at other consulates whose establishment in the zone territory may be expected.

I have a most gratifying report of Mr. Warren's cooperation in the matter of Spanish Moroccan territory and wish to take this opportunity of thanking you for it.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

Attachment

SECRET

Memorandum Analyt. A. Bente
Assistant Secretary
Department of State

SECRET

Mr. Mr. Barker

I have recently discussed with Mr. Robert Childs and Mr. Thomas Brown of the Department a program of OAS activities which it is hoped can be put into effect in Tangier and Spanish Morocco. Mr. Raymond Douglas has continued discussion with Mr. Fletcher Warren and they have tentatively agreed on the following specific program.

1. MELILLA: If it becomes necessary for the Department to assign Mr. Fletcher, present Consul at Melilla, to some other post, the Department will send to Melilla a career foreign service man of the grade of Junior Consul to replace Mr. Fletcher before his departure. This man would be available to OAS for complete indoctrination in the OAS problem in Spanish Morocco, the method of handling OAS communications, and the special requirements of security that are involved.

2. MELILLA: The OAS will furnish to the Department a suitable man who would be appointed as a non-career vice consul or clerk to work with and under the general supervision of either Mr. Fletcher or his successor at Melilla. He would be primarily responsible to OAS for his activities, directives and communications, but, of course, would be under the immediate supervision of the Consul.

3. CEUTA: The Department to send a career or non-career vice consul who before his departure would be available to OAS for complete indoctrination and training. This man would occupy the vice consular office alone and would be responsible jointly to the State Department and OAS. He would, of course, be responsible to the Charge d'Affaires at Tangier in respect to his consular duties and to the OAS man at Tangier for his extra consular activities.

4. TANGIER: The OAS will furnish a suitable man who will be appointed Assistant Petroleum Attache at Tangier to the Petroleum Attache, Mr. Richard Downard, who also is an OAS man. This Petroleum Attache will be primarily responsible to OAS for his extra-consular activities but under the general jurisdiction and supervision of the Charge d'Affaires at Tangier.

1. The CIA is to furnish a suitable secretary to be designated or designated by the Department as secretary to the Director of the CIA. This secretary will be responsible to the Director and will be under the general jurisdiction and supervision of the Director of the CIA.

I would very much appreciate it if you would give this your consideration and approval so that the necessary steps may be taken to put the above plan into effect as soon as possible. I believe the details can be worked out by Mr. Bishop and Mr. Martin.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover

cc: Mr. Fletcher Warren
Mr. Thomas Gibson

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

6 May 1944

To: The Director
 From: Chief, SI Branch
 Subject: SX Program

For your attention there are attached hereto the following items:

1. Summary of progress and development of the SX project
2. SX project file
3. Final letter of instructions to Ensign E. Wyllys Andrews

It is requested that the attached documents be returned to the Chief, SI by hand. - *done - 5/10/44* -

/s/ Whitney H. Shepardson

Attachments - 3



SECRET

SUMMARY OF PROGRESS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SA PROGRAM

1. On November 16th, the basic outline of the SA program was signed in which was described Phases One, Two and Three, and the various stations to be established in the area from Dakar to Tunis.
2. On December 14th, Colonel Burton in a letter of transmittal to Colonel Glavin described the plan for channeling of intelligence, not of primary interest to the Theater Commander, directly to Washington and not through the OSS Mission Headquarters, Algiers.
3. On February 18th, in a memo for the record it was agreed by the branch chiefs concerned, and approved by Colonel Burton and Brigadier General Magruder, that Colonel Wavely would be in charge of all SA and X-2 activities in the SA territory.
4. On February 18th, Mr. Ruyard Boulton and Major Douglas G. Banner were appointed Chief and Deputy Chief, respectively of the SA program, Washington. The Deputy Chief was to divide his time between SA field territory and SA Headquarters, Washington.
5. On March 8th, after a joint conference with SI and A-1, the A-2 procedure on cable traffic was adopted with the use of "PLATO" as an indicator for reasons of greater security. The SI procedure on pouch traffic was adopted.
6. On March 17, General Magruder, in a letter to the Director of Public Affairs, outlined a joint OSS-State program for the reopening of the Ceuta Consulate, the continuation of the Consulate at Melilla and the sending of additional OSS personnel to Tangier. This program was approved by the Department and has been implemented.
7. On March 20th, in a conference with Colonel Glavin the SA plan of November 26, 1943, was modified by the elimination of SA field headquarters and the high ranking SA officer, Colonel. Substantially, Phase One of the SA program was eliminated and the machinery for direct communication with and supervision of field stations by SA Washington was outlined. While the SA program was not invalidated, the tempo of SA operations was temporarily slowed down and the major emphasis was placed on the basic field organization rather than superstructure.

SECRET

9. On April 14th, an initial appropriation of \$150,000 from the period 1 July 1944 to 1 July 1945 was received.

10. On May 4th, the first letter of instructions was written for Paul H. W. Andrews, who is about to leave for Constantinople.

11. At the present writing the status of the SA program is as follows:

- a. Three SA personnel actually in the field.
- b. Four SA personnel waiting transportation.
- c. Efforts to recruit additional personnel are being vigorously pursued.

/s/ Rudyard Boulton
Chief, SA Program

6 May 1944

SECRET

May 1944

To: Mr. Edward Myllyr Andrews, USNR

From: Chief, CI

Subject: Final letter of instruction

1. Summary

You are hereby appointed US agent for the AX Program for French Morocco and Spanish West Africa. You are directly under and responsible to the Chief, AX Program, ONI, Washington. Also, you will also be directly responsible to Col. Gavin. At times for such activities and duties as are assigned you in connection with that group. It is understood that Col. Gavin will not wish to be informed of operational details connected with your AX mission.

2. Objectives

(a) To develop and carry out specific intelligence programs which are shown to you and AX Washington only. The bulk of these programs have been discussed with you and we believe you are thoroughly appreciative of the objectives involved.

(b) To undertake the penetration through any means available of the Spanish West African territories of Ifni, Melilla, and Ceuta, with particular attention to German activities in these parts -- especially the Axis radio stations located at Col Ifni, Col Ceuta, and Villa Cisneros.

3. Operational Objectives

Your objectives have been clearly outlined and the ways and means of attaining them must be left largely to your discretion. You will be particularly interested in all activities of AX operations.

Outside of AX personnel, the only people in the field who should know of your status as an AX agent should be Col. Gavin and Major Chapin, and they need only know as much of your mission as has been outlined in this final letter of instruction.

It is suggested that at every opportunity you attempt to develop your own information service and that you keep it as separate the same. You will have full authority and responsibility for obtaining the services of informants

You have the authority to hire sub-agents to operate any-
where in the territories included in your mission. In addition,
employment of a sub-agent, you will need the Washington
field office's approval of information on him. Your authority to con-
sider employment beyond sixty days depends upon our cable
approval.

In addition, to the intelligence part of your program
as laid in detail, you are to contact and re-evaluate
the situation of the program which has preceded you into
the field.

(1) You should contact Oricho at Oran and explain
the recent changes and developments in the X-K program.
Oricho came out with his means of communications so that
you can be in constant, direct communications with Washington
and the Department facilities in his area -- this
should be the method and in the manner outlined in the
oral direct plan note with Col. Glavin in Washington. You
should explain to Oricho the X-K system of numbering the
sub-agents, and the use of Pinto as the X-K indica-
tor of his code. You should also thoroughly discuss with
Oricho the commercial and government agency covers which
are used in his area. You should explain to Oricho the
current provisional plan for the employment of new agents.

(2) You should contact Quito at Marrakech or Fez,
Morocco, in order to determine the situation and future plans in order that we
can be in closer contact with the situation in these places.
Quito is a person who will remain in this area for a period
of several months to make it worthwhile, he should be brought
into contact with the X-K developments, and a method of communi-
cation should be worked out so that he will be independent
of the communication facilities, provided he will con-
sider the X-K program the X-K system of numbering
sub-agents, and the three man provisional employment plan should
be explained to him. No matter what his decision may be, possi-
ble commercial and government agency covers should be discussed
with him.

(3) You should contact Livorno and determine whether
there are any sub-agents there for the X-K program project.
If Livorno is to be used, you should, with the assist-
ance of Col. Glavin, determine the means of communication

SECRET

for him and explain in detail the established methods of building up a network. He should also be instructed in the X-3 method of recruiting agents and the three month pre-visional plan. You should also discuss with him the question of commercial and Government agency covers in his area.

(d) If arrangements can be made without disturbing the American Consul General or Coral, it would be desirable for you to visit Tangier and bring Coral up to date on the latest SI developments. However, this should only be done if it is entirely agreeable to both the Consul General and Coral. It would seem wise not to push this immediately on your arrival but to wait until the other assignments of your operational objectives plan have been completed. It might be better for Coral to come to you.

(e) On your arrival in Algiers, you should at the earliest possible moment discuss in detail with Col. Glavin his future plans for the Casablanca office, the particular attention to plans for Caspar. At the earliest opportunity you should advise us the results of these conversations.

c. Itinerary.

You should proceed by air as directly as possible to North Africa and from port of debarkation to Algiers, reporting your arrival as soon as possible to Col. Glavin, or Major Chapin, explaining that you are one of the SX elements, as described in paragraph 5, sub-heading "c" of the memorandum dated 30 March, 1944, entitled "Conference with Col. Glavin, SX Program." As one of these SX elements mentioned in Casablanca, you should nominally be an SI man working on SI problems relating to adjacent Spanish Territories. In such way, of course, report to Algiers in the normal way. However, your main responsibility will be as SX, Washington, and the real program, as defined in Airscale memoranda, will not be known to OSS, Algiers.

d. Communications

In your discussion with Col. Glavin, or Major Chapin, you should establish with him your methods of independent communication with Washington via State Department channels, as outlined in paragraph 5, sub-heading "b" of the memorandum entitled, "Conference with Col. Glavin, SX Program." as you will be mentioned in Casablanca, not Algiers. On the basis

-3-

SECRET

of our conversations with Col. Glavin, we assume that it will not be necessary for you to transmit your reports through Col. Glavin to Washington, as Direct State Department channels will be available to you in Casablanca.

The above suggested procedure will be subject to approval by Col. Glavin upon your arrival at Algiers. You will notify SI, Washington, immediately of any changes desired by Col. Glavin.

If the procedure outlined above is agreeable to Col. Glavin, you should arrange for such Consulate handling your communications to receive messages sent through State Department channels addressed to your code name, as follows:

"Cigar from Pencho"

In order that the question of accounting for costs of telegrams will not arise, you should arrange with the Consulate regularly handling your messages to pay for them by making a deposit against which the cost of messages can be charged, provided that this system is satisfactory to the particular Consul.

If the occasion should arise that you would ever have necessity and opportunity of sending a message in cipher or clear text by ordinary commercial facilities, it should be addressed to "VICTOR, Washington, D.C." which is the publicly known cable address for the Office of Strategic Services. Such messages as these will be signed "KMRIA."

You will be accorded the privilege of diplomatic pouch to the State Department and regular communications will be sent to you by the Consulate General at Casablanca. You should conform this with the Consulate General at Casablanca, and secure his agreement to send for you written communications to Mr. Frederick B. Lyons, Division of Foreign Activities Corporation, Department of State. Within this envelope containing the above address, you should place a sealed envelope containing your reports addressed to Whitney H. Shepardson, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D.C. However, on occasion in connection with your special mission, you can send particularly secret information to us by addressing the inner envelope to the Director of OSS, attention of R. Moulton only.

Your cable messages should be numbered serially beginning with No. 1, no matter through what channels they are transmitted. If through channels, other than your own, you

should include in the list of your cables. This is so that in the case of an emergency, you should report a cable to the office every two weeks unless circumstances beyond your control prevent you. From time to time you should receive further instructions regarding communications procedure from either the African Division or the Liaison Center.

V. Print Material

Two copies only will be made of operational material. One will be kept in the files at Casablanca. One will be sent direct to the State Department pouch. Four copies will be made of intelligence material, with the following distribution:

- (a) Direct to the State Department, via State Department pouch.
- (b) Information copy to Algiers.
- (c) Information copy to London, via Algiers.
- (d) Copy for Casablanca file.

Cables

Cables will be sent by direct or non-secret channels direct to the State Department, Washington, and, if the material is of a sensitive nature, to Algiers, and, if the material is of a sensitive nature, to London. One strip cipher will be used. However, you will be equipped with a personal cipher known only to yourself and Washington and authorized to use this cipher in direct communication with the State Department when the situation warrants. You will use the indicator "Pinto" on all direct cables.

The code name by which to identify your cables and other communications is "Pancho" and your code number is 901. This code name should be given by you to the U.S. Consulate handling your communications. Your cables should be by the appropriate channels encephered.

C. Placards

As an agent at Casablanca, funds will be provided by the Placard Office at Algiers, or (if 8057th Hq. Col continues to maintain the office at Casablanca) by the Casablanca Placard

SECRET

affairs. Strict accounting of these funds spent in connection with activities requested by Algiers will be sent to the Fiscal Officer in the theater. Accurate accounting of SX expenditures will be rendered the Fiscal Officer, Washington, in the form outlined in Circular Letter No. 80, which you have read and a copy of which will be pouched to you.

D. G. B.


SECRET

To: Gen. Buxton

Since you approved the original S-X plan, these modifications have probably already been made known to you. I am submitting them, however, in case they were not submitted to you hitherto.

April 12 1944

RT
RT



SECRET

(10449)

Office of the Secretary

SECRET

Intelligence Service 11/12/46
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

30 March, 1944

**12
1944 MAR 31 PM 12 36**

**To: Secretariat
Attention: Mr. E. Putzell**

From: Divisional Deputy, Africa, SI

Attached is copy # 1 of 8 copies of a memorandum revising the SX Plan which has resulted from a discussion between General Magruder and Colonel Glavin and representatives of I-2 and SI Branches. May I ask that this original be attached directly and permanently to the original copy of the SX Plan, dated 14 December, 1943, which was approved by Colonel Euxton.

R. Boulton
R. Boulton

*file
↑*

*Nid
I believe this letter
The letter should be
The Secretariat
BT*

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 30 March 1961

TO : Mr. W. E. Shepherdson, Chief, SI
 Mr. James Murphy, Chief, X-2
 FROM : Chief, SI Program
 SUBJECT: Conference with Colonel Glavin, SI Program

1. A meeting was held in General Magruder's office with the following persons present: General Magruder, Colonel Glavin, Major Chapin, Major Penner, Lt. Baker, Captain Harris, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Pearson and Mr. Kaulton. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the present status of the SI Program, its relation to the present situation in North Africa and the program to be followed in the future.

2. The SI Program was developed at a time when it was believed that AFHQ was momentarily due to move to the North. The delay in this move has thrown the timing of SI, as conceived, completely off balance. It is not only inappropriate, but impossible to proceed at present with the SI overseas organization as planned, for the following reasons:

a. OSS Algiers, is responsible to AFHQ for both SI and X-2 intelligence within the North African theater required by AFHQ in support of certain planned military operations. This intelligence must reach AFHQ through the channels which have been developed and are currently authorized. To upset this relationship by reorganization of SI and X-2 activities in North Africa at the present time would endanger and seriously hamper OSS relations with AFHQ.

b. AFHQ has laid down certain requirements of communication and handling of intelligence in North Africa with which OSS must comply. The nature of these limitations and the proposed SI organization are incompatible and Colonel Glavin is powerless to change the situation, or circumvent it without jeopardizing OSS position with AFHQ.

c. It is therefore inappropriate and impossible for Colonel Wavig to occupy the post of Chief of SI and Chief of X-2 for the North African SI territory as defined in the plan, and these appointments that have been made must be rescinded.

d. While the SI Program as such is not invalidated by the above, the method by which it was to be put into effect is impossible.

e. There can be no formal SI headquarters at Casablanca or anywhere else; nor open SI personnel or activities anywhere in the North African theater at any time.

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COPY / OF 600100

- 3 -

b. Each element of SX will report directly to Washington, independently without knowledge of reports made by other elements.

c. Those SX elements who are an integral part of OSS, Algiers, 2677th Headquarters Company, will transmit their reports through Colonel Glavin directly to Washington. Colonel Glavin will provide the necessary security for these reports with a view to preventing knowledge of these SX elements under his immediate jurisdiction from becoming known to other personnel in 2677th Headquarters Company.

d. Such SX elements as are not an integral part of 2677th Headquarters Company, i.e., civilians under commercial cover, civilians under other Government agency cover such as State, USRA, War Shipping, etc., will not be known to Colonel Glavin nor responsible to him. They will be responsible only to OSS, Washington, and their reports will be made directly to OSS, Washington, without reference to OSS, Algiers. In case of any incident arising from the activities of these men, Washington and not Algiers assumes responsibility for them.

e. Cover for all personnel who have any SX directives must be complete. Those SX elements who are an integral part of 2677th Headquarters Company must have obvious activities in connection with established branches such as SI, RAL, Communications, X-2, etc. Their SX activities and reports will be strictly a sideline in order to preserve their cover. Under no circumstances should these persons be conspicuous by reason of rank, responsibility, personality or authorized open activity.

f. There is no permanent place in the organization of 2677th Headquarters Company for additional high ranking officers such as Colonel Wavig or Lt. Colonel Mason, at this time; nor is such rank compatible with the revised SX program as outlined above. Colonel Wavig can contribute to the program by undertaking a mission, during which he would be responsible solely to Colonel Glavin, to survey the SX territory with a view to determining what elements of OSS might be retained in North Africa in the event that AFHQ moves on, and to survey the potential commercial covers that will eventually be possible for permanent SX, phase 2, personnel. On completing the survey, not later than May 30, 1944, Colonel Wavig will make his report to OSS, Washington. Should circumstances make it impossible for Colonel Wavig to undertake this survey, he will return to Washington for discussion with the X-2 Branch as to his future plans.

g. Assignments of all other SI and X-2 personnel to the SX program are temporarily suspended until the suitability of individuals to the revised program as outlined above can be confirmed.

Copies to
Mr. Murphy #3
Col. Glavin #4
SI #6
Secretariat #1

Mr. Shepardson #1
Gen. Magruder #2

A. B. Boulton
A. B. Boulton

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

26 February 1944

Intelligence Division OSS
2/12/44

X Africa North
X Development
X Personnel
X L. P. Jones

To: All Desk Heads and Chiefs of Sections
in X-2 Branch and SI Branch

From: Whitney H. Shepardson, Chief SI
Major John J. McDonough, Acting Chief X-2

Subject: Combined X-2 and SI Field Organization
(SX Operations for French West Africa,
Rio de Oro, Ifni, French Morocco, Tangier,
Spanish Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia)

Mr. Rudyerd Boulton, Chief of the Africa Section, SI,
is hereby appointed Chief of SX Program for OSS Washington
Headquarters.

Major Douglas G. Bonner, Africa Section, SI, is hereby
appointed Deputy Chief of SX Program. Major Bonner will divide
his time, as circumstances require, between Washington and the
Field, in performance of the necessary liaison between SX Head-
quarters here and the SX Field stations.

/s/ Whitney H. Shepardson

/s/ John J. McDonough,
Major, AUS

Approved:

/s/ John Magruder
General Magruder

SECRET

SECRET

21 Nov 1944

To: GENERAL DONOVAN

You asked me to locate some additional papers on this which you thought you had brought back with you. We have searched everywhere and find no trace of such papers.

ACD
O. C. D., Jr.

Thompson
5

Office of the Executive Officer

(30449)

SECRET

SECRET

Mr. Raymond Boulton

25 December 1943

Executive Office

BX Project

In accordance with our telephone conversation of this morning, I return herewith the attached papers on the so-called BX program for North Africa.

It is Col. Döring's and my recollection that General Donovan specifically disagreed with the advisability of using K-1 for cover in these operations. He also raised certain other objections to the first draft of the document which was submitted to him by Colonel Forgan.

In view of the question whether this organization has JCS authority to engage in intelligence in the post-war period, it would be important to know whether a decision has been made to take this matter up with the JCS.

In view of the fact that Col. Forgan conferred with General Donovan on the initial drafts of this paper, it is suggested that you and I meet with Col. Forgan to discuss these and any other points which you may have in mind.

D. J. Putnell, Jr.

Putnell: Birchard

Points raised from conference with Col. Forgan & Forgan on 12/23/43

When Col. Forgan approved paper

from draft dated 12/14/43

E. C. [unclear]

SECRET



SECRET

17 December 1943

TO: Acting Director
 FROM: Executive Officer, SS Planning Group
 (through OSS Secretariat)
 SUBJECT: SI Activities in NATO

1. The Planning Group today reviewed the proposals in the attached document. It concurs in the general scheme presented and notes that these activities are being incorporated in the special programs for the NATO.
2. With respect to Phase 3, the Planning Group believes that those operations will necessarily have to be conducted in the same manner as the activities now being conducted by OSS in neutral areas, with the knowledge and consent of the Department of State representatives in those areas.
3. The Planning Group also expresses the belief that it will be necessary to create in each of the areas in which OSS is now conducting its activities, an organization for post-war use that can be continued by permanent peacetime governmental agencies.

A. H. Ontrank

A. H. Ontrank
 Colonel, MI
 Executive Officer

001 0001 0001

Date 7 Dec.

To: ENS. PUTZELL

Re: The attached

1. Could you let Colonel Forgan know that the General indicated that he thought R & A cover should not be used as he thought it was very poor cover.

2. Could you find out from Col. Forgan whether Gen. Donovan made any decision as to whether the question of pursuing this work should be taken up with the JCS. I do not know what the General's reaction to that was. In any case would you make a note of what Col. Forgan says and put it on the list of matters to be taken up with the General when he returns.

SECRET

(OC) *De*

Office of the Secretariat

(9119)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Intelligence Service 063
Africa North
X Development
X St Project
X Permanent
 14 December 1948

Colonel S. J. Slavin
 Chief, Intelligence Policy and Company
 Continental (Prov.)
 A. I. S. S.
 Atlanta, Georgia

Dear Colonel Slavin:

In conversations with Mr. James A. Murphy and Colonel Lanvin here, and with Mr. Murphy prior to his recent visit to your headquarters, you have been apprised of our plans for continuing our activities in North Africa. These plans have been developed and agreed upon as outlined in the attached memorandum, which will be handed to you by Colonel Lanvin.

During Phase Two, which will be essentially a transitional period, we have decided that you will be chiefly concerned with operations on both sides of the front in Southern Europe with a secondary interest in SI and VI activities and operations in North Africa. It is probable that each of these activities will not have a direct relation to military operations in the theater. Washington and London will, on the other hand, have a primary interest in those operations and in the secondary interest in those which are carried out and the speed of their completion.

For Phase Three, it is hoped that during these two years you will have developed such resources to the extent that you will be able to carry out the operations in the theater with a secondary interest in North Africa. It is probable that each of these activities will not have a direct relation to military operations in the theater. Washington and London will, on the other hand, have a primary interest in those operations and in the secondary interest in those which are carried out and the speed of their completion.

I will leave it to you and to Colonel Lanvin to work out the details of this plan and to report on the progress.

Sincerely yours,

S. Edward Buxton
 S. Edward Buxton
 Acting Director

*P.S. General D. approved
 the substance of the
 basic memorandum before
 leaving Washington.*
Glenn

SECRET

the proposed organization, and

2. Organization of OSa Activities in North Africa

In carrying out the development of OSa activities in North Africa, the following general program is proposed:

1. MISSION

To create and maintain a permanent organization to engage in secret intelligence and counter-espionage activities in that part of North Africa which is under the jurisdiction of NATOUSA. It is proposed that this organization shall continue to operate after the withdrawal of our armed forces from the area. (For convenience, in this memorandum only, the proposed joint SI and X-2 operations in North Africa are referred to as IX).

2. ORGANIZATION

1. General Considerations. It is contemplated that there will be three phases in the organization and development of IX operations. Phase One will cover the period during which the present OSa mission exists. Its headquarters in North Africa. Phase Two will be the period of transition as personnel is withdrawn from North Africa and will continue until the area ceases to be part of a military theater of operations. Phase Three will be the permanent peacetime organization.

2. Headquarters. IX operations will be under the direction of a Chief who, during Phases One and Two, will be responsible to the Strategic Services Office in the North African Theater.

During Phase One IX will be attached to Mission Headquarters and use its facilities as far as possible. During Phase Two, IX Headquarters will

-2-

be continued at Algiers until such time as the Chief of SX decides that some other location in the area is more desirable.

Although, as indicated hereafter, field agents will engage in both SI and X-2 activities, it is not believed that it will be necessary to have separate section chiefs attached to SX Headquarters but a sufficient staff will be organized to segregate, record and route SI and X-2 material received; to furnish the field stations with necessary information and instructions; and otherwise to carry out efficiently the mission assigned to SX. During Phase One, the existing staff in Mission Headquarters will be used as far as possible to prevent duplication of work and to insure close working relations between all elements of the Headquarters. During this phase, however, the SX staff which will remain in the area during Phase Two will be organized and trained.

During Phase One it is not thought necessary to have a separate evaluating and reporting unit for SX operations, since intelligence collected by its agents can be processed by the personnel attached to OSS Mission Headquarters. During Phase Two, however, the organization of an evaluating unit will be left to the discretion of the Chief of SX and will depend upon the nature and volume of the material collected. During Phase Three it may not be possible to maintain a collecting, evaluating and forwarding office in the area, in which case, the reports of field agents will be forwarded directly to Washington for processing and dissemination. However, the principle is recognized that it is desirable to maintain supervision of agents and evaluation of intelligence as close to the source of information as possible.

3. Field. It is proposed that field stations be established as follows, the number of agents tentatively to be assigned to each station being indicated opposite each:

3.

TUNISIA
Tunis

2 2

ALGERIABone (Constantine)
Algiers
Oran7
2
3
2MOROCCO - FRENCHOujda
Fes (Taza - Gueioif)
Casablanca (Rabat)
Marrakech (Agadir)6
2
2
3
1MOROCCO - SPANISHTangier
Melilla4
3
1FRENCH WEST AFRICA

Dakar

2 2

The foregoing does not include office and other employees. Each station will be established as a separate post reporting directly to SX Headquarters during Phases One and Two.

The immediate program is the establishment of competent primary agents at key locations. Thereafter, local undercover agents will be recruited wherever suitable candidates can be found. The utmost care will be taken in the selection of local agents and, in no case, will they be recruited during the first two phases of operations without the specific authorization of the Chief of SX.

III. PERSONNEL.

1. The personnel for Phase Three will be recruited, processed, and established during the first two phases. This personnel will be of the highest caliber and, so far as possible, will consist of individuals who will be willing to live in the area and to devote themselves to secret intelligence as a career and not merely for the duration of the war. Personnel now operating in North Africa will be transferred by name to the SX organization.

4.

2. Those whose associations with OSS activities have become known will be relieved for transfer to other stations as soon as suitable replacements for them have been established in their respective posts but such transfers will be made only by or after consultation with the Chief of BX.

3. Field personnel will be qualified to represent both BX and K-2.

IV. COVER

1. With the knowledge and approval of the military authorities of the Theater, BX operations may be carried on during the first two phases with known and established personnel but all personnel and operations must be under complete cover during Phase Three. For that reason, particular care will be taken to provide all new personnel sent into the field with effective covers before leaving the United States.

2. In view of the permanent nature of the BX organization both in the United States and in the field, particular emphasis will be laid upon the training of personnel. The training and proving of agents for eventual service on the continent may be used as a cover for the handling and operation of BX agents in North Africa.

3. Consideration should be given to the use of R & A as a cover for BX operations, either through the maintenance of an ostensible R & A research unit in North Africa after the removal of the Mission Headquarters, or through R & A participation in any governmental or economic commissions operating in the area. Any use of R & A for this purpose will be under the direction of the Chief of BX.

4. During Phases One and Two, the Chief of BX will unavoidably be identified with OSS operations. During Phase Three it may be impracticable to maintain a chief in the area but, if a supervising agent appears necessary, he must have a cover wholly unconnected with intelligence activities.

5.

V. COMMUNICATIONS

1. As a precautionary measure, to provide for future emergencies, a number of radio sets, sufficient for emergency service, will be secretly planted at convenient locations throughout the area and trusted operators will be procured and trained.
2. In order to preserve the cover of the organization, it is important that no unusual methods of communication be employed except in the case of an emergency.
3. Direct communication between field stations and agents will be resorted to only in case of emergency or when authorized by the Chief.

Whitney H. Shepardson
 Whitney H. Shepardson
 Chief, SI Branch

John M. McDonough
 John M. McDonough
 Major, AFSC
 Acting Chief, X-2 Branch

John Magruder
 John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
 Deputy Director, OSS

November 26, 1943

H. F. Wanyig
 H. F. Wanyig
 Col., PA
 Field Chief SX

Rudyard Boulton
 Rudyard Boulton
 Chief, Africa Section SI (SX)

G. E. Buxton
 G. E. Buxton
 Acting Director, OSS

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

11 November 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR Colonel G. Edward Suxton
(Through the Secretariat)

SUBJECT Development of OSS Activities in North Africa.

1. The attached memorandum is the basic paper which was approved by the Director, with paragraph 7 on Communications re-written to reflect his views on this subject. Actually, this paragraph is the same as except that sub-paragraph 1 was added.

2. The Chief SI Branch and the Chief X-2 Branch are currently arranging for the implementation of the plan.

J. R. Morgan
Colonel J. R. Morgan, G.S.C.
Acting Deputy Director, OSS Intelligence Service

SECRET

SECRET

11 November 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR Colonel G. Edward Buxton
(Through the Secretariat)

SUBJECT Development of OSS Activities in North
Africa.

1. The attached memorandum is the basic paper which was approved by the Director with paragraph 7 on Communications re-written to reflect his views on this subject. Actually, this paragraph is the same except that sub-paragraph 1 was added.

2. The Chief SI Branch and the Chief M-2 Branch are currently arranging for the implementation of the plan.

Colonel J. R. Forgan, O.S.O.
Acting Deputy Director, OSS - Intelligence Service

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Intelligence Policy 12/8/45
revised 11/1/46
SECRET
1. Requirements
2. Development

8 November 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, OSS

SUBJECT: Development of OSS Activities in North Africa

In carrying out the development of OSS activities in North Africa, the following general program is proposed:

I. MISSION.

To create and maintain a permanent organization to engage in secret intelligence and counter-espionage activities in that part of North Africa which is under the jurisdiction of HATOUSA. It is proposed that this organization shall continue to operate after the withdrawal of our armed forces.

II. ORGANIZATION.

1. General Considerations. It is contemplated that there will be two phases in the organization of the operation. Phase One will occur for that period of time during which OSS is permitted to operate in the theater. During this phase the operation should be considered as attached to the existing OSS mission in the theater, and the facilities of that mission should be utilized in so far as possible. Phase Two will occur when the existing

SECRET

- 2 -

drawn. From that time on the operation will be on a self-contained basis.

The operation will be under the charge of [redacted] who will be responsible to the Intelligence Officer, North African Theater Mission during Phase One, and [redacted] will be directly responsible to OSS Washington.

3. Headquarters. Initially, it is proposed that the headquarters of the Chief be established at the headquarters of the OSS mission in Algiers. If at a later date the headquarters of the mission are removed to the mainland, the Chief of the organization should nevertheless continue to operate with a rear echelon of the mission remaining in Algiers or such other place as is then designated. During Phase Two the Chief will establish his own headquarters at whatever location seems most convenient.

Since, as indicated hereafter, agents will engage in both SI and X-2 activities, it is thought unnecessary to have separate section chiefs attached specifically to the headquarters of this organization. However, headquarters should have a staff sufficient to segregate and route SI and X-2 material when received; and also to advise the field stations of information necessary to the proper performance of their duties. To this end a close working arrangement should be maintained between this staff and their equivalents in the present OSS mission. The staff should

- 3 -

SECRET

be kept small and should not duplicate existing facilities in the theater. If the volume of material makes necessary additional personnel, they should be assigned to the desks and reporting units in the established mission.

During Phase One, it is also thought unnecessary to have a separate evaluation and reporting unit for the organization, since intelligence collected by it can and should be processed by personnel attached to the existing OSS mission. During Phase Two, the necessity for processing material in the field will diminish in importance and reports of agents can be forwarded directly to Washington. If at that time it is determined to employ sub-agents, decision can then be made whether a small processing unit will be required.

4. Field. It is proposed that field stations be established as follows, the number of agents tentatively to be assigned to each station being indicated opposite the station:

<u>TUNISIA</u>		
Tunis	2	2
<u>ALGERIA</u>		
Bone (Constantine)	2	7
Algiers	3	
Oran	2	
<u>MOROCCO - French</u>		
Oujda		3
Fes (Taza - Guercoif)	2	
Casablanca (Rabat)	2	
Marrakech (Agadir)	3	
	1	

- 4 -

SECRETMOROCCO - Spanish

Tangier

Melilla

3
1

4

FRENCH WEST AFRICA

Dakar

2

2

TOTAL

23

The foregoing does not include office and other employees.

Each station will be established as a separate post reporting directly to Algiers.

The immediate program is the establishment of competent primary agents at key locations. Thereafter, sub-agents may be recruited locally as the occasion may arise. The utmost care should be taken in the selection of such sub-agents, and in no case should they be recruited without specific authorization from the Chief.

III. PERSONNEL.

1. Personnel of the organization should be of the highest caliber, and if possible should consist of individuals who are willing to devote themselves to secret intelligence work as a career, and not merely for the duration of the war. Personnel now operating in North Africa should be attached to the organization, but should be replaced as rapidly as possible unless they have sufficient cover.

2. Field personnel will be qualified to represent both SI and X-2.

3. Personnel now available in the field are as follows:

- 5 -

SECRET

Casablanca	5
Tangier	2
Oran	3
Fes	1

In addition, there is one agent in training who is expected to be sent to Tangier shortly.

IV. COVER.

1. Heretofore OSS agents in North Africa have to some extent been operating with the knowledge of and in collaboration with French security organizations. It is contemplated, however, that ostensibly there will be in the near future a discontinuance of British and American intelligence activities. We are informed that all counter-intelligence personnel of the Army has already been withdrawn from the static commands. If, therefore, the proposed organization is to carry on successful operations, it is probable that such operations will have to be carried out under covers that can be effectively maintained with respect to all interests in the area. For that reason particular care should be taken to examine the cover, if any, of each agent now operating in the area, and to provide new personnel with effective cover before leaving the United States.

2. During Phase One the Chief of the organization should maintain cover as a member of the OSS mission, ostensibly having duties assigned to him of an open and legitimate nature. During Phase Two it will be necessary for the Chief to adopt a cover unconnected with OSS.

SECRET**V. TRAINING.**

In view of the permanent nature of the organization, particular emphasis should be laid upon the training of personnel. Existing training facilities, though ostensibly used only for training of agents for forward echelons, can also be used to supply cover for the local training of agents to be attached to this organization.

VI. R & A.

In view of the nature of the work carried on by RAA, it is not believed that any personnel of that branch need to be attached to the proposed organization. However, consideration should be given to the use of RAA as a cover for the operations, either through the maintenance of an ostensible RAA research unit in Algiers after the removal of the mission headquarters, or through RAA participation in any governmental or economic commissions operating in the area.

VII. COMMUNICATIONS.

1. As a precautionary measure to provide for future emergencies, a number of radio sets sufficient to service the area should be secretly planted at convenient locations and trusted local operators should be trained.
2. Subject to the above, it is not believed that special communication facilities need be used, since ordinary diplomatic and commercial channels of communication will

- 7 -

SECRET

presumably be available. Except in the case of an emergency, it is particularly important that no unusual methods of communication be employed, in order to preserve the cover of the organization.

3. Direct communication between field stations will be only as authorized by the Chief.

SECRET

2 November 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, OSS

SUBJECT: Development of OSS Activities in North Africa.

In carrying out the development of OSS activities in North Africa, the following general program is proposed:

I. MISSION.

To create and maintain a permanent organization to engage in secret intelligence and counter-espionage activities in that part of North Africa which is under the jurisdiction of MATOUSA. It is proposed that this organization shall continue to operate after the withdrawal of our armed forces.

II. ORGANIZATION.

1. General considerations. It is contemplated that there will be two phases in the organization of the operation. Phase One will occur for that period of time during which OSS is permitted to operate in the theater. During this phase the operation should be considered as attached to the existing OSS mission in the theater, and the facilities of that mission should be utilized in so far as possible. Phase Two will occur when the existing

SECRET

the mission is withdrawn. From that time on the operation will be conducted on a self-contained basis.

B. **Chief.** The operation will be under the charge of a Chief who will be responsible to the Intelligence Officer of the North African Theater Mission during Phase One, and thereafter will be directly responsible to OAS Washington.

C. **Headquarters.** Initially, it is proposed that the headquarters of the Chief be established at the headquarters of the OAS mission in Algiers. If at a later date the headquarters of the mission are removed to the mainland, the Chief of the organization should nevertheless continue to operate with a rear echelon of the mission remaining in Algiers or such other place as is then designated. During Phase Two the Chief will establish his own headquarters at whatever location seems most convenient.

Since, as indicated hereafter, agents will engage in both SI and X-B activities, it is thought unnecessary to have separate section chiefs attached specifically to the headquarters of this organization. However, headquarters should have a staff sufficient to segregate and route SI and X-B material when received; and also to advise the field stations of information necessary to the proper performance of their duties. To this end a close working arrangement should be maintained between this staff and their equivalents in the present OAS mission. The staff should

SECRET

be kept small and should not duplicate existing facilities in the theater. If the volume of material makes necessary additional personnel, they should be assigned to the desk and reporting units in the established mission.

During Phase One, it is also thought necessary to have a separate evaluation and reporting unit for the organization, since intelligence collected by it can and should be processed by personnel attached to the existing CMI mission. During Phase Two, the necessity for processing material in the field will diminish in importance and reports of agents can be forwarded directly to Washington. If at that time it is determined to employ sub-agents, decision can then be made whether a small processing unit will be required.

4. Field. It is proposed that field stations be established as follows, the number of agents tentatively to be assigned to each station being indicated opposite the stations:

TUNISIA
Tunis

2

11

ALGERIA
Bône (Constantine)
Algiers
Oran

2

2

2

7

MOROCCO - French

Oujda
Fes (Fes - Ouezzif)
Casablanca (Rabat)
Marrakech (Agadir)

2

2

2

1

11

SECRET

MOROCCO - 1
 ALGERIA - 1
 TUNISIA - 1

NORTH AFRICA
 TOTAL

3
 1
 2
 6

The foregoing does not include office and other employees.

Each station will be established as a separate post reporting directly to Algiers.

The immediate program is the establishment of competent primary agents at key locations. Thereafter, sub-agents may be recruited locally as the occasion may arise. The utmost care should be taken in the selection of such sub-agents, and in no case should they be recruited without specific authorization from the Chief.

XII. PERSONNEL.

1. Personnel of the organization should be of the highest caliber, and if possible should consist of individuals who are willing to devote themselves to secret intelligence work as a career, and not merely for the duration of the war. Personnel now operating in North Africa should be attached to the organization, but should be replaced as rapidly as possible unless they have sufficient cover.

2. Field personnel will be qualified to represent both SI and I-2.

3. Personnel now available in the field are as follows:

SECRET

Casablanca
Tungier
Cran
Tom

1
2
3
4
5
6

In addition, there is one agent in training who is expected to be sent to Tungier shortly.

IV. COVER.

1. Heretofore OSS agents in North Africa have to some extent been operating with the knowledge of and in collaboration with French security organizations. It is contemplated, however, that ostensibly there will be in the near future a discontinuance of British and American intelligence activities. We are informed that all counter-intelligence personnel of the Army has already been withdrawn from the static commands. If, therefore, the proposed organization is to carry on successful operations, it is probable that such operations will have to be carried out under covers that can be effectively maintained with respect to all interests in the area. For that reason particular care should be taken to examine the cover, if any, of each agent now operating in the area, and to provide new personnel with effective cover before leaving the United States.

2. During Phase One the Chief of the organization should maintain cover as a member of the OSS mission, ostensibly having duties assigned to him of an open and legitimate nature. During Phase Two it will be necessary for the Chief to adopt a cover unconnected with OSS.

SECRET**V. TRAINING**

In view of the permanent nature of the organization, particular emphasis should be laid upon the training of personnel. Existing training facilities, though historically used only for training of agents for forward operations, can also be used to supply cover for the local training of agents to be attached to this organization.

VI. R&A.

In view of the nature of the work carried on by R&A, it is not believed that any personnel of this branch need to be attached to the proposed organization. However, consideration should be given to the use of R&A as a cover for the operations, either through the maintenance of an identifiable R&A research unit in Algiers after the removal of the mission headquarters, or through R&A participation in any governmental or economic commissions operating in the area.

VII. COMMUNICATIONS.

1. As a precautionary measure to provide for future emergencies, a number of radio sets sufficient to service the area should be secretly planted at convenient locations and trusted local operators should be trained.

2. Subject to the above, it is not believed that special communication facilities need be used, since ordinary diplomatic and commercial channels of communication will

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personally be available. Except in the case of an emergency, it is particularly important that no unusual methods of communication be employed, in order to preserve the cover of the organization.

3. Direct communication between field stations will be only as authorized by the Chief.

Intelligence Source - OSS: 12-886

Correspondence with
Office re Development of
OSS Activities in N. Africa

14 Dec. '43

Africa Note
SX Paper

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A Development
Personnel

Document _____

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(Africa Development)2 Glavin - via Wavvig3 Hagrud4 Shepardson5 McDonough6 Boulton7 Col. Wavvig (for personal use)8 Secretariat

Note: Sent Glavin the orig. signed letter and a photostat of the signed agreement. Sent Col. Buxton, for the Director's files, a photostat of the signed letter and the original signed agreement.

(9549)

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, OSS

SUBJECT: Development of OSS Activities in North Africa

In carrying out the development of OSS activities in North Africa, the following general program is proposed:

I. MISSION

To create and maintain a permanent organization to engage in secret intelligence and counter-espionage activities in that part of North Africa which is under the jurisdiction of NATOUSA. It is proposed that this organization shall continue to operate after the withdrawal of our armed forces from the area. (For convenience, in this memorandum only, the proposed joint SI and X-2 operations in North Africa are referred to as SX).

II. ORGANIZATION

1. General Considerations. It is contemplated that there will be three phases in the organization and development of SX operations. Phase One will cover the period during which the present OSS Headquarters is in operation in North Africa. Phase Two will cover the period when the Headquarters is withdrawn from North Africa and will continue until the area ceases to be part of a military theater operations. Phase Three will be the permanent peacetime organization.

2. Headquarters. SX operations will be under the direction of a Headquarters. The Headquarters will be responsible to the Strategic Services Council in the North African Theater.

3. Staff. The Headquarters will be attached to Mission Headquarters and will be organized as far as possible. During Phase Two, SX Headquarters will

-2-

be continued at Algiers until such time as the Chief of SX decides that some other location in the area is more desirable.

Although, as indicated hereafter, field agents will engage in both SI and X-2 activities, it is not believed that it will be necessary to have separate section chiefs attached to SX Headquarters but a sufficient staff will be organized to segregate, record and route SI and X-2 material received; to furnish the field stations with necessary information and instructions; and otherwise to carry out efficiently the mission assigned to SX. During Phase One, the existing staff in Mission Headquarters will be used as far as possible to prevent duplication of work and to insure close working relations between all elements of the Headquarters. During this phase, however, the SX staff which will remain in the area during Phase Two will be organized and trained.

During Phase One it is not thought necessary to have a separate evaluating and reporting unit for SX operations, since intelligence collected by its agents can be processed by the personnel attached to OSS Mission Headquarters. During Phase Two, however, the organization of an evaluating unit will be left to the discretion of the Chief of SX and will depend upon the nature and volume of the material collected. During Phase Three it may not be possible to maintain a collecting, evaluating and forwarding office in the area, in which case, the reports of field agents will be forwarded directly to Washington for processing and dissemination. However, the principle is recognized that it is desirable to maintain supervision of agents and evaluation of intelligence as close to the source of information as possible.

3. Field. It is proposed that field stations be established as follows, the number of agents tentatively to be assigned to each station being indicated opposite each:

3.

<u>TUNISIA</u>		2
Tunis	2	
<u>ALGERIA</u>		7
Bône (Constantine)	2	
Algiers	3	
Oran	2	
MOROCCO - FRENCH		8
Oujda	2	
Fes (Taza - Guercif)	2	
Casablanca (Rabat)	3	
Marrakech (Agadir)	1	
MOROCCO - SPANISH		4
Tangier	3	
Melilla	1	
<u>FRENCH WEST AFRICA</u>		2
Dakar	2	

The foregoing does not include office and other employees. Each station will be established as a separate post reporting directly to SX Headquarters during Phases One and Two.

The immediate program is the establishment of competent primary agents at key locations. Thereafter, local undercover agents will be recruited wherever suitable candidates can be found. The utmost care will be taken in the selection of local agents and, in no case, will they be recruited during the first two phases of operations without the specific authorization of the Chief of SX.

III. PERSONNEL.

1. The personnel for Phase Three will be recruited, processed, and established during the first two phases. This personnel will be of the highest caliber and, so far as possible, will consist of individuals who will be willing to live in the area and to devote themselves to secret intelligence as a career and not merely for the duration of the war. Personnel now operating in North Africa will be transferred by name to the SX organization.

4.

2. Those whose association with OSS activities have become known will be relieved for transfer to other stations as soon as suitable replacements for them have been established in their respective posts but such transfers will be made only by or after consultation with the Chief of SX.

3. Field personnel will be qualified to represent both SI and X-2.

IV. COVER

1. With the knowledge and approval of the military authorities of the Theater, SX operations may be carried on during the first two phases with known and established personnel but all personnel and operations must be under complete cover during Phase Three. For that reason, particular care will be taken to provide all new personnel sent into the field with effective covers before leaving the United States.

2. In view of the permanent nature of the SX organization both in the United States and in the field, particular emphasis will be laid upon the training of personnel. The training and proving of agents for eventual service on the continent may be used as a cover for the handling and operation of SX agents in North Africa.

3. Consideration should be given to the use of R & A as a cover for SX operations, either through the maintenance of an ostensible R & A research unit in North Africa after the removal of the Mission Headquarters, or through R & A participation in any governmental or economic commissions operating in the area. Any use of R & A for this purpose will be under the direction of the Chief of SX.

4. During Phases One and Two, the Chief of SX will unavoidably be identified with OSS operations. During Phase Three it may be impracticable to maintain a chief in the area but, if a supervising agent appears necessary, he must have a cover wholly unconnected with intelligence activities.

5.

F. COMMUNICATIONS

1. As a precautionary measure, to provide for future emergencies, a number of radio sets, sufficient for emergency service, will be secretly planted at convenient locations throughout the area and trusted operators will be procured and trained.
2. In order to preserve the cover of the organization, it is important that no unusual methods of communication be employed except in the case of an emergency.
3. Direct communication between field stations and agents will be resorted to only in case of emergency or when authorized by the Chief.

November 26, 1943

Whitney H. Shepardson
 Whitney H. Shepardson
 Chief, SI Branch

H. F. Wanyig
 H. F. Wanyig
 Col., PA
 Field Chief SX

John J. McDonough
 John J. McDonough
 Major, AJS
 Acting Chief, X-2 Branch

Rudyard Boulton
 Rudyard Boulton
 Chief, Africa Section SI (SX)

John Magruder
 John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
 Deputy Director, OSS

G. E. Buxton
 G. E. Buxton
 Acting Director, OSS

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Publications **B-870**
Propaganda **K-695**
& Dissemination

19 October 1943

DISTRIBUTION FOR The Director, OSS
 (Through the Secretariat)

Report on Discontinuation of Intelligence

1. The attached report on dissemination of intelligence prepared by Mr. Montgomery of this office is forwarded for information and any comments you may care to make. Copies of this report have been furnished to the chiefs of the Intelligence Branches.

W. P. Morgan
Colonel W. P. Morgan, U.S.C.

Acting Deputy Director, OSS - Intelligence Service

at the present.

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19 October 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR The Director, OSS
(Through the Secretariat)

SUBJECT Report on Dissemination of Intelligence

1. The attached report on Dissemination of Intelligence prepared by Mr. Montgomery of this office is forwarded for information and any comments you may care to make. Copies of this report have been furnished to the Chiefs of the Intelligence Branches.

Colonel J. L. Forgan, G.S.C.
Acting Deputy Director, OSS - Intelligence Service

Attachment

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SECRET**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES****INTEROFFICE MEMO**

TO: Acting Deputy Director--IS
 FROM: James A. Montgomery, Jr.
 SUBJECT: Report on Dissemination of Intelligence.

DATE: 14 October 1945

A. SI - REPORTING BOARD.**1. External Dissemination.**

- (a) **MID:** Distribution to MID is in general satisfactory. That agency receives all but a fraction of OSS reports, and those not distributed to that agency are in most cases not of legitimate interest to it. On occasion reports which should go to MID are not sent to it through inadvertence, but such items are usually caught in this office. The MID-SI liaison officer performs his duties faithfully, and arranges that the needs of his agency are satisfactorily filled. He is in constant communication both with the Reporting Board and members of your staff.

The mechanical distribution of reports to MID is well handled. The MID-SI liaison officer spends roughly half of his day in OSS, the other half in the Pentagon Building. He is given two copies of each report. These copies are distributed daily, one to the collection branch and one to the geographical branch interested. In addition, some three months ago a separate liaison officer was established to deal with the Order of Battle Branch in MID. This officer each day takes to that Branch a separate set of all reports dealing with Order of Battle intelligence.

- (b) **ONI:** Distribution to ONI has also been satisfactory in the main. Experience with JICA, however, has indicated that ONI appears to be interested in a broader distribution than has been the case in the past. Several batches of reports have therefore recently been submitted to ONI through its liaison officer to set up new standards for distribution. In the case of this agency also, there is constant discussion between the liaison officer, the Reporting Board, and this office.

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- (c) A-2: Arrangements have recently been made by this office to provide that all reports of interest to A-2 go to that agency through its liaison officer. In addition, an extra copy is transmitted of such reports as deal with Axis submarine intelligence.
- (d) State Department: Distribution of reports to State has in the past not been altogether satisfactory. This has resulted partly from inattention to the needs of the State Department and partly from fear that State would accuse this organization of dealing too much in political intelligence. This problem has been the subject of informal discussion both with the Reporting Board and also with Deaks in the State Department. As a result, distribution of reports to that agency has been substantially improved.
- (e) Miscellaneous: Distribution of reports to other agencies than those listed is not substantial and calls for no particular comment. As a result of inquiries from certain branches of the armed services, however, it should be noted that SI has now established a Technical Intelligence Desk to provide a more efficient and rapid method of making technical intelligence available to such branches as Ordnance, Engineers, etc. Contact has been established with the separate intelligence service recently established by A3F, and arrangements are now being made to furnish such intelligence as may be appropriate to the newly created liaison officer for the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth.

2. Internal Dissemination.

- (a) R & A: Normally RMA receives all reports disseminated by the Reporting Board. On occasion the Reporting Board receives intelligence which is not given the normal dissemination because it is involved in some way in operations. Discussions have been had with the Reporting Board with a view toward an informal dissemination of such intelligence to the particular section in RMA directly concerned with the material.

Up to a few months ago certain types of foreign intelligence were sent only to Dr. Langer's office and were not deposited in CID. This arrangement has now been revised so that all foreign intelligence now goes to CID as a matter of course except for one series of a particularly secret character and of interest to only one division in RMA. This material is retained in Dr. Langer's office and shown to that division.

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- (b) P N: Since it appeared that FN was not receiving all SI reports of interest to it, a survey has been made by FN at the request of this office, and the Reporting Board has been handed a memorandum indicating in detail the types of intelligence of interest to this branch.
- (c) X-2: After discussion with Mr. Murphy and examination of the distribution to this branch, the Reporting Board has been requested to distribute all items of political intelligence to X-2 as background material.
- (d) PW Room: Arrangements have been made to have this Room supplied with copies of all reports disseminated by the Reporting Board. Through this office the Current Intelligence Staff is also given immediate access to cabled intelligence of interest to it.

3. Periodic Reports.

The Reporting Board issues weekly tables showing the origin and distribution of all material disseminated by it.

4. Volume of Reports.

figure
There has been a general increase in the volume of reports disseminated. Furthermore, the percentage of reports from OSS agents, as opposed to those received from foreign intelligence agencies, has also increased.

5. Speed of Dissemination.

*check
later*
Cabled intelligence is now processed, dittoed and distributed normally the same day that it is received by the Reporting Board. This applies unless the material is received too late in the afternoon to permit of processing on that day. In such cases, however, the intelligence, if important, is informally called to the attention of the various liaison officers, State Department, or other interested agencies. Pouch material is processed and distributed as fast as facilities permit. The work of the Board is somewhat handicapped at present by lack of personnel. Abnormal delays between the date of origin and the date of dissemination appear usually to be due to deficiencies in the collection process.

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SECRET**6. Value of Reports.**

Reports in general indicate an improvement in quality. Periodic evaluations are now furnished by MID and ONI. The MID liaison officer states that both the quality and quantity of the reports have shown a steady improvement. The most recent evaluation by ONI (although on a smaller scale) also indicated that the reports were well received as respects value, timeliness and originality.

7. General Comments.

Deficiencies are still apparent. There is a tendency to distribute a number of relatively old, out-of-date and trivial reports. In view of the large number of reports now disseminated, and the excellent quality of many of them, it would seem that OSS could afford to be more selective. A few reports indicate the need for further editing. Others indicate the need for a more experienced method of evaluation such as might be afforded by consultation with R&A. Distribution of particular types of reports to units both within and without OSS is sometimes erratic and inconsistent. On the whole, however, both the organization and the distribution of the reports seem to be receiving more attention. All of these questions have been the subject of continuous discussion between this office and the Board.

B. R & A.

Both internal and external distribution of R&A reports appears to receive adequate attention. The distribution of each report which is prepared and approved is given special consideration by the Projects Committee, which meets daily. Distribution varies according to the value of the report, the branches or agencies interested, and the security to be afforded to the material. R&A also maintains lists of reports available for both inside and outside distribution.

C. C I D.

All documents received by CID appear on a confidential accessions sheet which receives both outside and inside distribution, and also on the secret "L" list, which is reserved for documents available only for inside distribution. At the suggestion of this office the inside distribution of these lists has been extended and improved, sectional headings have been added, and a revised and standard set of source symbols has been adopted.

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5.

In recent months a separate list has been established for Order of Battle Material, thus making the regular accession lists more usable.

The Pictorial Records Section distributes all photographs received by it to MID and ONI, as well as supplying the needs of R&A. At the suggestion of this office arrangements have recently been made for regular liaison with the two service agencies in order to achieve a more realistic distribution of material, as well as to improve the collection process and prevent excessive duplication.

The Biographical Records Section supplies information on request to various branches of OSS and also to OWI, ONI, the State Department, and CAD. In addition, major reports have been prepared for OWI, the School of Military Government, and OSS missions in the field. Recently this Section has entered into an arrangement with the State Department whereby it would supply all biographical data on individuals of interest to the sections of that Department engaged in post-war planning. As a result of this arrangement, it is understood that the State Department will not establish a separate unit for this purpose. A similar arrangement has also recently been effected with BEW. Again, the result has been that BEW will not set up a separate biographical unit.

Dissemination of material by CID is adversely affected by faulty indexing and inadequate provisions for routing documents. Due to pressure of work, CID does not now index a large amount of material received from SI, although arrangements have been made with SI to avoid duplication as far as possible. It is believed that other material is probably over-indexed. Examination of the records of the Document Control Room indicates that the customers of the Division on occasion have had to wait much too long to see requested material. These and related problems have been the subject of a number of discussions between CID and members of this office. It is believed that a more energetic administration of the Division, coupled with a more thorough understanding of the needs of its customers, will produce substantial improvement.

D. F. V.

Both the inside and outside distribution lists of this branch have been discussed with the staff of this office. Distribution of each report receives individual attention, and the problem seems to be intelligently handled. The branch requests the advice of this office periodically on doubtful questions of distribution. In the case of important and significant reports, digests have been prepared by the current intelligence staff for distribution to the White House map room. The branch has also adopted the suggestion of this office that each report should be headed by a brief summary of its contents.

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SECRET**E. Current Intelligence Staff.**

The purpose of this Staff is to furnish a speedy method of distribution for items of immediate interest. Dissemination is made by means of a Daily Summary, covering items of major interest, and also by the PW Weekly. Significant items cleared through this office are also selected for distribution to the White House map room.

The PW Room also affords a useful and simple method of making original reports of timely interest available to the members of OSS. The reports on view include SI reports, PW reports, and periodical releases from other Government agencies, foreign intelligence agencies, and OSS outposts. A copy of all JICA items of general interest is now deposited in the Room.

Recent extensions of the service afforded by this Staff include the preparation of weekly digests for the outposts.

F. S O.

It is now apparent that certain messages from SO agents will contain a certain amount of intelligence. Arrangements have been made to submit this material to the Reporting Board for screening and distribution, and also for its inclusion in the Daily Summary.

G. Distribution between Missions in the Field.

Several months ago it was apparent that many of the missions in the field were communicating only with Washington, although the intelligence was of immediate interest to other field missions. Accordingly, an Office Order was prepared providing for lateral distribution between the field offices. The sense of this Order is that distribution should be made not only to Washington, but to all other field offices interested in the particular intelligence. The provisions of this Order seem to be generally observed. Distribution has been improved by recent improvements in communications. The Current Intelligence Staff has been recently asked to supply to the outposts significant material (such as that contained in radiophone messages from Bern) which is not laterally distributed.

NAM

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10 October 1943

TO: Dr. Rogers
FROM: General Donovan

Your memo of September 13th to Col. Burton I have just read. It makes good sense, and I think most of the suggestions you make in regard to Italy, at least, are being carried out. I will discuss that with you.

Re Hungary: You know that we are already dealing with it through Dulles and by other means that I will tell you about.

Re Yugoslavia and Greece: We already have our officers there, and we must make a supreme effort this month in getting more there.

SECRET

Date: 9/20/43

JM
To: General *JMS* ~~1943 SEP 22 PM 5 19~~ Mr. Scribner

Re: attached memo from Chairman, Planning
Group -- Notes for General Donovan -
dated September 13, 1943

For your information and then to be
returned to General Donovan's files.

G. EDWARD BUXTON

G. Edward Buxton
Assistant Director

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Intelligence Service - 055 12,772

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES


WASHINGTON, D. C.

x Italy

x Social Intelligence

To Gen. *Wengert* and
 Mr. *Schubert* + return to
 Gen. *Di's* file - *GR*
 TO: Colonel *Buxton*
 FROM: Chairman, Planning Group
 SUBJECT: Notes for General Donovan

13 September 1943



The following ideas which have been before the Planning Group are worth calling to the attention of General Donovan, I think.

1. The impressions our troops and occupation officers make on the Italian people will be of great influence throughout the rest of Europe, particularly the Balkans, France and Spain. The newspapers will be censored while the communications between the people themselves, presenting their confidential views and attitudes will circulate rapidly through Europe. It seems to us, therefore, that O.S.S. in Italy should be concerned not merely with the combat intelligence, which seems most to be occupied, but with a mass of political, social and religious intelligence gathered clandestinely. A satisfactory atmosphere is attained in Italy only by constantly testing its pulse in the underground. The response particularly which is crystallized in the minds of Communist and Social Democrats will affect the policy of Russia and the democratic elements of Europe. We are already getting through church channels news of the conduct of the occupation in Sicily. Even under adverse circumstances information from this source circulates in wide areas and very rapidly.

2. The Germans, upon retiring in Italy, will be able to leave an elaborate series of listening posts which will furnish not merely military intelligence to Berlin but will have important consequences as respects the political policy of the Army, the Party, and other elements in Germany. This system was at work in North Africa but access to Italy is many times more easy than was the case of Algiers. There is not merely a counterespionage problem of the type, but an opportunity for political contacts.

3. The Italians have undoubtedly had a secret service of their own in Europe and especially in Germany, France and the Balkans. This ought, if properly handled, be available to us

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but it may be necessary to provide support. The Italian net work would probably not be trustworthy if we took it over as a whole but it ought, if preserved, to be able to continue contributions of its own. Without the collaboration of the Government it could be easily scattered or submerged unless promptly reached and supported. There are in addition a very large number of scattered Italians in Germany, France and the Balkans with whom communication is already established by their friends.

4. Hungary is the only one of the Balkan countries not occupied. She is trying to change sides. She is the last refuge of feudalism, with a number of minor nobility and bourgeoisie who would be anxious to find personal protection by some collaboration and would find it easy to shelter our representatives. Hungary has apparently the most open social structure and the most easily passed boundaries in Europe. She has a close sentimental association with the Poles. The Hungarian and Pole friendship is perhaps the most striking international sentiment in Europe and the Polish underground is well established. It ought to be possible soon to enter Hungary through either Yugoslavia or from Switzerland and there ought to be available personnel. It would seem to us that a clandestine establishment near Budapest might be workable.

5. The large authority now approved to operate in Yugoslavia, with the access suddenly opened up across the Adriatic, permits operations which might be as influential as a military occupation itself. Yugoslavia is a member of the United Nations and Churchill, in his recent address, publicly promised Greece and Yugoslavia alone of all the nations of Europe, complete support for the future. This leaves us no political problem in respect to Yugoslavia or the avoidance of the Great-Slay controversy. American operations on a large scale in the way of supplying the guerrillas from the North Adriatic, of guiding and directing them, can have immense political consequences not only in the Balkans but in the whole question of world balance. There is no reason now for subordinating our operations to satisfying the British because of their possession of air transport denied to us. This country, from Yugoslavia north, will get much the best cooperation, as we are known to be disinterested and disinclined to any political manipulations. The guerrillas, if supplied and supported, are probably capable of and intent upon, acting by themselves. The political side of our participation becomes important. This should not be neglected.


6. The Hungarian oil fields and the communication lines between them and Germany, particularly the Danube River, and the railways following its valley, are perhaps of greater importance

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- 3 -

to Germany than any single target outside the Reich. Bombing of the Ploesti refineries will now be greatly facilitated. One of the largest dependencies of Germany on Rumania is for heavy oils rather than gasoline or lubricants. Bombing cannot greatly interfere with heavy oil deliveries as only the refineries are vulnerable. Heavy oil, except in the winter months, is carried chiefly on the Danube River in barges from Giurgiu, north. The river and rail traffic from Belgrade west and north is close to the mountain area occupied by the Yugoslavian guerrillas. Interruption of this traffic by ground operation would seem worth your consideration.


James Grafton Rogers,
Chairman, Planning Group.

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SECRETBASIC REQUIREMENTS OF A
SYSTEM**SECRET INTELLIGENCE**

I shall omit any discussion as to the desirability of attaching an American secret intelligence system to any particular governmental department or agency. Certain management decisions can be made on behalf of the responsibility stemming directly from the President, or its being responsible to someone greater or less degree to the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, etc. However, it is evident that it should have a permanent status so that its personnel will be guaranteed continuity of tenure, rights to retirement pay, pensions, insurance, and the other benefits that are ordinarily made available to Government employees.

Since our present SI service will probably for the duration of the war continue to be attached to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will not pursue this subject.

The basic requirements of such a service appear to me to be:

1. Executive control vested in a civilian director. Since the powers of the director in an irregular organization of this type are very great, it is essential that he be a man of the highest character and ability. Any director who was merely appointed for political reasons could very quickly wreck an organization which had been built up along sound lines over a period of years.
2. Secrecy. There is a certain tendency to scoff at the necessary secrecy which attends intelligence activities of this nature. However, it must be remembered that it is essential that the operations of such a service should be exposed as little as possible to public notice, Congressional investigation, and the like, to say nothing of the necessity for protecting the usefulness and even the lives of undercover agents.
3. This service should have no domestic functions whatever. Secret matters within the continental United States and its possessions should be dealt with by a separate organization. Not only do the problems of internal security differ from those of external secret intelligence by nature, but experience in other countries has shown that it is highly dangerous to vest in one individual the great powers that he would be in a position to exercise if he controlled both of these fields.
4. The objectives of a secret intelligence service should embrace not only military, naval and air matters, but also economic, political, sociological and psychological subjects, as well as any other intelligence of a secret variety which might be useful in the formulation of Government policy, or in protecting the Nation against attacks whether economic, political, military or otherwise, by other Nations.
5. A separate budget and the use of unvouchered funds is essential to the proper conduct of this work. Whatever budget hearings are necessary should be held in secret session. The British practice of adopting a budget without discussion, except as to amount, is the preferable one. Wherever possible, but

United States

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especially in administrative and clerical positions, it might as well to have personnel covered by Civil Service rules, so that such personnel could be afforded the benefits of Civil Service. However, experience has shown that (1) for reasons of security and (2) because persons with highly specialized qualifications are the most valuable for the prosecution of this work, and salary and expense arrangements must be made with them to fit the particular cases, so far as expense accounts are concerned the element of human integrity and judgment enters into every decision of this kind. No governmental financing procedure has been devised which can adequately meet these situations. Nevertheless, as close an accounting must be made as is possible in view of the peculiar conditions of the work. The unvouchered funds finance officers of this organization should be a man of complete integrity and preferably with a large business and finance experience.

6. Cover.

Secret service operatives, whether officers or agents, must possess "cover". In other words, their ostensible occupation in whatever country they are working in should thoroughly disguise the real direction of their interests. The State Department is that agency of the American Government whose facilities, on the whole, are most useful in this connection. Cover as professional men, scientists, business men, etc. is comparatively easy to arrange in peace time, but often becomes almost valueless in war time. In war time, not only should cover be granted by State and other established government departments, but the military and naval forces should grant when necessary both commissions and appointments, such as those of assistant naval and military attaches, to operatives of a secret intelligence service.

7. Passports.

Passports, visas, and so forth, should be granted by the State Department upon the request of the director of secret intelligence. These privileges should be accorded on his request, not only to American nationals but, in his discretion, to aliens.

8. Communications.

Communications are the very backbone of secret intelligence work. In peace time it is essential that SI be permitted, if it desires, to use its own codes anywhere in the world, and, wherever it wishes to, have clandestine receiving and sending radio stations, in any American Embassy or Legation. It should have, if necessary, its own courier service between various points, and in any event should have untrammelled use of the pouch facilities of any department or agency of the American Government. Moreover, its communications, of whatever nature, should not be subject to scrutiny or examination by any person whatever, including our diplomatic representatives in foreign countries.

9. The service must be entirely independent of that of any other Nation. No matter how close may be at

United States

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Equal Rights

times, the relationships between secret services representing different countries. At some time may come when the failure of one service will imperil the usefulness of the other. Moreover, each is designed primarily to serve the interests of its own country alone.

10. Transportation.

When necessary, transportation facilities such as aircraft, priorities for travel and so forth should be afforded it in reasonable measure.

11. It is taken for granted that counter espionage is an integral part of any satisfactory secret service. In this connection it is essential that, ~~as a rule~~, all the cryptographic services of a Nation should be under the control of its SI unit. Especially in the political field, this is probably the one most valuable asset that such a service can possess. It should also, where censorship exists, be free if it so desires, to establish its own personnel in any censorship bureau or branch whatever.

12. Technical.

Laboratories should be established, and the best paid chemists should be employed. The nature of secret service work demands expensive and up-to-date equipment of many kinds. It should, in addition, have made available to it any apparatus or information developed by internal ~~secret~~ ^{security} organizations or other departments or agencies. ^{Such as FBI}

13. Training.

It is taken for granted that training schools with appropriate cover may be set up by it in any place within the discretion of its director.

14. In order to make the best use of its facilities, a successful SI should have attached to it in some manner the equivalent of our present R&A branch. I think it might be arranged to have groups of College professors enter the service of the Government, even on a temporary basis, of perhaps two years at a time, so that all over the country there will be built up a corps of men of high specialized ability, who will be able to make use of the raw material gathered by SI and will acquire at the same time a knowledge of techniques of SI work. It might be possible to rotate groups of professors or loan from their Colleges. I will not follow this point further as it would require considerable elaboration.

*File Intelligence**12,735/17*
S.I.
Intelligence Bureau
12,735/17

7 February 1944

TO: General William J. Donovan

FROM: Major de Vries

In accordance with your request of Saturday evening, I
enclose:

1. Estimate of Situation to serve as a basis for long-range organization.
2. Memorandum setting forth the approach to the problem of the relationship between liaison with Allied Intelligence services and independent cover operations.
3. Memorandum on preliminary contact with certain persons in the anti-Pasey group.
4. Summary of Netherlands Intelligence Report which was mentioned in the Sunday Times of February 6, 1944.

H. P. deV.
H. P. deV.

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Estimate of Situation

Subsequent to the entry of American forces into western Europe many decisions must be taken by our military authorities concerning administration of liberated areas, and measures to be applied to enemy areas. These decisions must be made on the basis of information emanating from liberated and enemy areas. Plans already formulated and approved are designed to aid American military operations by projecting agents into the rear of enemy lines in the course of such operations with a view to furnishing tactical intelligence concerning movements and disposition of enemy reserves, supply and communications. At the present time O.S.S. bases in Bern, Stockholm, Madrid, Lisbon, Algiers, Cairo and Istanbul are actively penetrating enemy occupied areas through networks of underground agents furnishing information on battle order, industrial capacity, supply and state of enemy morale. It is essential that all sources of information developed by O.S.S. be kept in a constant state of readiness and be constantly available to the American Commander in Chief in the Continent.

Recognizing that it is impossible to formulate precise information on a constantly shifting strategic situation, it is nevertheless possible to outline generally the objectives of our intelligence gathering organization.

The purpose of Secret Intelligence Service, ~~as of our information gathering organization~~ is to provide to its own Government by secret

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add extra-diplomatic means any information on other states that would be helpful in its dealings with them. Since politics is the expression not only of a national people towards both its internal and external relations, but also of the will and aims of a given government at a given time, a SIS must be concerned, first and foremost with politics as the medium in which it must function. But it must be concerned with politics in its broadest sense as representing all the major forces of national life: military, industrial, commercial, agricultural, religious, and educational. Keeping always in mind that these forces go to make up the politics of a nation and that they are in turn influenced by the political will of the government at a given time, the informational objectives of Secret Intelligence as of any information gathering organization may be listed as follows:

- 1) Political institutions
- 2) Social structure of society and control
- 3) Ideology, alliances and theories
- 4) Political structure and forces
- 5) Armed forces
- 6) Foreign relations
- 7) Economy
- 8) Culture and Commerce
- 9) Foreign Policy
- 10) Geography
- 11) Location
- 12) Climate

It is a common fallacy to think that the scientific method is a mechanical process that can be applied to any problem. In reality, the scientific method is a flexible and iterative process that is used to test hypotheses and develop theories. It is not a rigid set of rules, but a way of thinking that emphasizes evidence and logical reasoning. The scientific method is a process that is used to test hypotheses and develop theories. It is not a rigid set of rules, but a way of thinking that emphasizes evidence and logical reasoning. The scientific method is a process that is used to test hypotheses and develop theories. It is not a rigid set of rules, but a way of thinking that emphasizes evidence and logical reasoning.

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by local administration.

1) Local Administration

- a) Its attitude towards the activities of an American CI within its jurisdictional area and the extent to which this attitude follows or deviates from the attitude of the national government.
- b) Its personnel, their political affiliations, their political affiliations, their personal goals, ethics and personalities, their private lives.
- c) Its relations with the national administration.
- d) Its attitude to the local support and opposition.

2) Local Internal Security and Control

- a) Identification and personnel of the local police, secret police, and other intelligence services.
- b) Control of identity, movement, and communications.
- c) Control of the press (and the possibility of countermeasures) against the activities of the American CI.

3) Local Internal Security (Continued): Local and National

- a) Identification and personnel of the local (or national) security forces, their political affiliations, their personal goals, ethics and personalities, their private lives.
- b) Identification and personnel of the local (or national) security forces, their political affiliations, their personal goals, ethics and personalities, their private lives.
- c) Identification and personnel of the local (or national) security forces, their political affiliations, their personal goals, ethics and personalities, their private lives.
- d) Identification and personnel of the local (or national) security forces, their political affiliations, their personal goals, ethics and personalities, their private lives.

-4-

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- b) Political Parties: their organization, aims, extra-party affiliations, numerical strength, and influence in the national government.
- c) Political Personalities
- d) Illegal or concealed parties and/or political movements; their aims, organization, national and international affiliations, and leadership.
- e) Government representation abroad
 - i. The Foreign Service
 - ii. Secret intelligence services
 - iii. Other government-sponsored agencies: commercial, industrial, cultural, etc. (e.g. tourist agencies, commercial missions, student exchanges and the like).

4) Armed Forces

- a) Organization: numerical strength; quality and quality of armament; types of equipment; etc.
- b) Immediate and long-range planning
 - i. Leadership: qualities: composition of
 - ii. Character traits
 - iii. Personal relations within the armed forces
 - iv. Political and social activities
 - v. Relations with the leaders of the armed forces of other nations

5) Border Areas

- a) Organization: numerical strength, etc.
- b) Leadership: composition, relations, etc.
- c) Political and social activities
- d) Relations with the armed forces

6) Internal Security (Internal Security)

- a) Organization: composition, relations, etc.

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-5-

b) International Affiliations

a) Type, quantity and quality of production

b) Sources: private loans, govt subsidies, etc.

c) Political activities: relations with political parties, with the Army, etc.

d) Key personalities

c) Industrial Commerce

a) Industrial organizations: numerical strength and aims

b) Industrial activities

c) International affiliations

d) Key personalities

d) Arms

a) Types of arms and munitions

b) Production methods

c) Distribution: local, regional, etc.

e) Education

a) Educational institutions: training of civil and military personnel

1. Technical schools
2. Universities
3. Military academies

b) Educational institutions: training of civil and military personnel

c) Educational institutions: training of civil and military personnel

d) Educational institutions: training of civil and military personnel

e) Educational institutions: training of civil and military personnel

-7-

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these serve as liaison bases to maintain contact with allied intelligence services. Still others serve as potential bases for future operations or more long-range plans. The personnel of these, both as to type and number will vary with the function of such bases.

The presence of secret intelligence operations is the establishment of networks of undercover and ideological agents for the collection of information not available to official government intelligence, and to supplement information received. To maintain these networks with the necessary degree of security and efficiency, the following principles must be observed:

- (1) The use of personnel, the collection of communications, and the use of funds must be controlled.
 - (2) The use of personnel must be controlled by type, by function, and by the degree of their commitment.
 - (3) The use of communications must be controlled by type, by function, and by the degree of their commitment.
 - (4) The use of funds must be controlled by type, by function, and by the degree of their commitment.
- When the above principles are followed, the establishment of networks will be controlled by American intelligence and, if necessary, it is contemplated that a continuing liaison will be maintained with allied intelligence services of allied nations to the extent necessary for the execution of American intelligence operations.

1. The first step in the process is to identify the problem or issue that needs to be addressed. This involves gathering information and understanding the context of the problem.

It is important to have a check on the progress of the work in this line of research. It is important to have a check on the progress of the work in this line of research. It is important to have a check on the progress of the work in this line of research.

The immediate problem is the creation of a
completely independent system of American inter-
ference in the continent at the earliest opportunity.

...at the earliest opportunity
...the past intelligence service, to ensure
...as furnished with necessary information

- the right and opportunity to recruit and retain a certain type of personnel; to recruit and secure communications; to select strategic points; to coordinate of other Government agencies and private interests with respect to cover and penetration; to use existing techniques and to develop new ones.

...based in territories controlled by
...in view of the ease with which
...be completely independent without the
...shall, within which undercover
...be effective. This liaison shall in
...general exchange of information and methods,
...efficiencies of their intelligence services,
...where our service is handicapped, and as a
...thing that must be done in force adequate

- 2 -

security can be established. Nevertheless, it should be clearly recognized that what we are doing is maintaining a basic cover which will be in a position to protect and foster the growth of undercover operations. We also recognize that our function is all in the securing of reliable information concerning military, political, economic, sociological and psychological developments in liberated and enemy areas, regardless of the source and regardless of the policy which may be formulated on the basis of this information.

Our discussions for establishment of bases in certain countries in the Continent are predicated on considerable thought as to the points raised above and also a considered evaluation of the degree of effective cooperation and freedom of action that can reasonably be expected from a particular individual or group that can be in a position to grant us formal facilities on the continent. The rest to be verified in this latter instance is surely a pragmatic one and requires a close observation of and maintenance of contact with cabinet politics of the various countries strategically situated for our purposes. As a result of almost daily contact, we are continually reminded that individuals with whom we have been in contact touch for a period of time after use this association as a means of buttressing their internal position.

It must be noted that the intelligence services with which we have been in close contact are aware of the probability of the development of an independent American intelligence - independent, that is, from the reliance on British transportation and communications imposed by the American Theater Commander. The British intelligence service has a deep interest in the success of our projected future operations.

All these factors indicate the vital necessity of maintaining a firm liaison with the intelligence services of our Allies in the period of active military operations in a particular country. It is in this light that bases should be established in certain countries where American interests can properly command a degree of immunity from interference. It could be expected in a number of cases that national policies could be expected of effective nature. It would also be expected that some degree of cooperation would be expected from our operations. The confidence enjoyed by the leaders of French via other intelligence services, and the cooperation in their part to call for the development of our growth. However, we are all aware that it is our duty to serve our Government properly in our national relations and to serve our Government properly in our national relations and to serve our Government properly in our national relations.

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As a result of discussions with Mr. Seward Morgan of R. A. we believe that the Civil Affairs Handbook they are working on provide valuable material concerning the basic control systems and, therefore, of intelligence sources in each country in which we may want to operate. Our job will then be to develop undercover networks which will be in the best position to maintain contact with the groups in each country which re-formulate its national policy. This may be done in liaison with intelligence services other than that of the particular country concerned, with independent networks operating from bases at selected points established within the Continent, or from bases outside the Continent.

The principle of flexibility which is the basis of secret intelligence organizational structure will govern the scope and degree of the collaboration with other intelligence services, and the extent of the independent networks that can be created in particular areas. In some areas we contemplate that some of us will be working hand in glove with the service of a particular country while others will be projecting independent organizers and another territory. In the case of the Netherlands, for example, our liaison cover might well be based on their interest in maintaining contact with us because of operations in the East. In the case of Belgium the interest of certain Ministers in certain arrangements, which will be of vital importance to their national development, might well offer a higher degree of security and penetration by us than more formal arrangements. All the states must be played and our bargaining position constantly improved. This requires continuous re-examination of the shifting fortunes of numerous individuals who are only too willing to attempt to mislead.

Finally, let us not lose sight of the thought that by a source we mean only an office for purposes of communication, and that, in addition, we cover protection. Our discussions with our allied friends bear only on the maintenance and extension of the latter shall. The degree of independence is our constant bargaining problem.

In conclusion may I add that the phrases I have in mind "from the firing line to the fire" and "control of the horse inside, not kicking a horse until he has lost the race" are not new. The degree of independence is our constant bargaining problem.

H. J. D. VRIES,
Major, AUS.

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101. **Walter de Vries**

102. **J. A. G. G. G.**

103. **Interview with G on 3/2/44**

Note: The following only gives the substance of statements made by G and does not include many details.

Through his friendship with a French naval officer who had been naval attaché in Madrid before the revolution, G has been able to have an inside view of French developments. This officer was then Cdt. Moret. He afterwards changed his name to Houlet (or vice versa), and was ADC to Admiral Muselier during all the time that the latter took an active part in the command of Fighting French Forces.

Muselier was entitled to be the French Commander, for the naval forces were originally much larger than those under DeGaulle; and it is only thanks to the assistance of the British Government that DeGaulle got to share the leadership at first and finally succeeded in ousting Muselier after the unfortunate St. Pierre et Miquelon affair. DeGaulle managed to shift all the responsibility on Muselier although it was DeGaulle himself who had organized the whole thing. Muselier was afterwards relieved of his command and was even denied the opportunity to go to Algeria to join Giraud. Cdt. Houlet, however, managed to get across and became naval ADC to Giraud.

DeGaulle was originally a "cagouillard" and a close friend of La Rocque. He was however, in close touch with P. Reynaud who always supported him in his fight for tank material against the General Staff and finally made him Minister of War. Before the armistice DeGaulle was sent to England to beg for more assistance, he was then representing both the right and left wing political parties. He still remains the man who was originally very close to the right wing parties and afterwards arranged to gain the confidence of the left. But he is neither fascist nor communist and is more of a nationalist than anything else.

DePrény is likewise a former well-known so-called fascist; he is not so friendly with the communists and is also basically nationalist.

The Comité de Libération and its Assemblée Consultative are also a combination of extreme right and left wing parties, all basically nationalist except perhaps for the communists, who may have other motives.

The various "resistance" groups inside France are however very diverse. They are made up of:

- a. The very powerful labor organization CGT
- b. The Socialists
- c. The Radical-Socialists
- d. Most of the catholic organizations of both right and left.

It can be said that the French North African governmental organizations do not represent the majority of the people in occupied France. In fact, although DePussy is supposed to have full responsibility for all propaganda inside France, a lot of this is being done under direct instructions of the resistance groups.

An important development is the increased activity of the communists. Inside France they are a minority but have become useful due to the fact that they disposed of the only well organized underground net work of long standing. This has been one of the basic organizations of all resistance group activities. Outside France they are much more active and their representation in the Consulting Assembly is far out of proportion with their numbers inside France. It now appears that the Russians are making all efforts to develop French communist organizations and most important is the assistance given in this work by the Czechoslovak Minister Benes since he returned from Moscow. Benes' secretary here appears to be easily led to talk about all this and should be approached with proper cover, if possible.

G says he will give us next time more details regarding communist activities in France, in North Africa and in Spain.

G also recommends contacting

X of Trevaux for travel

J for organizing units in future

B for Argentinean contacts

A should be given translations work to do in order to find opportunities to talk.

G finally requests answer regarding employment of Miss H.

P.R.O.

72A February, 1944

TO: Major deVries.

FROM: Jan Lavarde. *Jan Lavarde*

SUBJECT: Summary of Netherlands Intelligence Report (OIA SP-114)

The following are excerpts from a letter written to a friend in Holland in September 1943 by a non-commissioned Officer of the Netherlands Army, who, with many others was sent back to Germany as a prisoner of War, in May 1943. *from Prisoner*

The German order of May '43, forcing all members of the Dutch Forces to go back to Germany as Prisoners of War, was as is well known, only followed by a very few of the people to whom this order applied. This man was one who did follow the German order, and he starts out by stating his deep regret that he was foolish enough to do so, and thus deliver himself into the hands of the completely degenerated, sadistic and brutal people of Germany. He goes on by stating that the revenge of the Dutch survivors will be terrible and without mercy.

He arrives in an SS Camp Altengrabow after two days of travelling without food. He was given a cup of soup, whereupon the C.O. of the camp told them that they must sign a paper showing their preparedness to work for the Germans and assist them in combating the Bolsheviks. They refused as one man, and kept us this refusal although they were threatened with being sent to the Mercury Mines, to be shot, etc. Finally, they were sent to a penal camp, also under SS leadership where they were subjected to a starvation campaign - of 1200 men 200 died in two and a half months. The simple signing of a document could have saved their lives, but none weakened.

The starvation campaign was conducted by withholding all fats and vitamins, the daily diet consisted of 1/2 lb of bread, 1 pt of water containing a little sauerkraut, vinegar and a gherkin. Never any albumin or fat, potatoes or vegetables. After 3 weeks the two trees in the camp had been stripped of bark and leaves which were eaten. At night we lay near the barbed wire trying to eat the grass on the other side.

They were housed in a horse stable without straw, blankets or shoes.

A terrible plotter is painted of the G.O., who, withheld food for 24 hours on the slightest excuse. This was always followed by additional deaths. The dead had to be buried by their comrades, and for the digging of each grave one slice of bread was given, consequently there were terrible fights in order to determine who would be allowed to be the grave digger.

The letter continues with the story of a trip to another camp. They were driven into railroad cars like cattle, and travelled for 3 days, 48 to a baggage car. No food or water was furnished, and many died on the trip. Several such transfers were made, always under more or less similar conditions.

The writer ends his letter by again cursing every German - man, woman and child.

A commentary on this letter, which was received from Holland at the same time, states that it is difficult to determine how far the facts reviewed in this letter are true. However, there have been other indications that the treatment of Dutch Prisoners of War has been contrary to all existing conventions, and it is urged that immediate steps be taken to try to correct these horrible conditions as much as possible.

Gen. Donovan

CONFIDENTIAL

Colonel G. Edward Buxton

September 22, 1945

Brigadier General John Magruder

Proposed inspection of overseas censorship stations.

1. In order to improve the operation of the Censorship Section, IS, it is desired to send Lieut. (jg) William F. Blois, Jr., of the Censorship Section, IS, to visit the following censorship stations:

U. S. Censorship station, San Juan, Puerto Rico
Imperial Censorship station, Trinidad
Imperial Censorship station, Bermuda

This trip will occupy about three weeks.

2. It is believed that, by obtaining a first-hand knowledge of the operation of these stations and the traffic passing through them, it will be possible to improve the quality of the intelligence material received by OSS.

3. If this project meets with your approval, kindly so indicate below and return to me.

John Magruder, Brig. General
Deputy Director, IS

Approved:

G. Edward Buxton, Acting Director

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Gen. Dan...

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Colonel G. Edward Huxton

September 22, 1948

Brigadier General John Magruder

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3. If this project meets with your approval, kindly so indicate below and return to me.

John Magruder, Brig. General
Deputy Director, IS

Approved:

G. Edward Huxton, Acting Director

CONFIDENTIAL

W. H. S.
 Joint Intelligence
 Collection Agency
 JICA

April 20, 1945

General Magruder

Mr. W. E. Sheppard

Mr. Chapin has sent me a copy of his memorandum of April 23, 1945 in you, subject, "Joint Intelligence Collection Agency (JICA) Algiers."

It would seem to be nothing but common sense and justice that we resolve, at this end, the intelligence which our people provide for the common pot. Would it not be a good idea for our O.S.S. intelligence men to put a distinguishing mark on each of the reports which they hand in to the JICA in North Africa. These O.S.S. reports are all we want. Upon their arrival here we could claim either the originals or copies thereof. If we claimed the originals it might put some strain under the Collection Branch of M.I.S. to provide means for making copies for themselves and for C.I.I. before the originals get out of their hands and into ours.

W. H. S.
 W. E. S.

C.C. General Deane
 C.C. Mr. Chapin

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General Magruder

April 28, 1948

I. B. Shapiro

Joint Intelligence Collection Agency, Algiers (JICA)

The following cable concerns the activities of JICA:

No. 147 from Donovan to Eddy, March 28.

"Will you arrange, as regards your work with Sharp and Major, that we have ample opportunity to examine and work on the material when it has arrived here."

No. 3 from Eddy for Donovan:

"Reference your 147, Colonel Sharp, who seemed most cordial when I talked to him, has shown me a form letter which is to be used in transmitting all reports from JIC. The letter will be addressed to Chief of MIS, the War Department. Included will be a draft request that the information be passed on to OSS, A-2, and ONI."

The first three reports to reach OSS from the JICA Reception Center arrived today and are transmitted to you herewith.

The Reception Center is in the Navy Department and these reports were sent from the Center to the Collection Branch of MIS where they were handed to Dr. Callisen for delivery to OSS. Dr. Callisen informs me that these three items were selected as being of particular interest to OSS and that we consequently received the originals. He also informs me that Colonel Ted Smith of the Collection Branch of MIS, and Lt. Colonel Sydney Morgan, Executive Officer of the Collection Branch of MIS, have agreed that hereafter Dr. Callisen should be present at the opening of pouches arriving at the JICA Reception Center for the purpose of looking over all incoming material and selecting that which he believes to be of interest to OSS.

Dr. Callisen states, however, that there are some kinks to be worked out in the system for handling this material. In particular, there are no facilities for reproducing and consequently an arrangement must be made whereby material for OSS can be reproduced for the benefit of A-2 and ONI. To this end Dr. Callisen would like to have the attached reports returned to him at some time so that copies can be made.

April 21, 1941

You will be interested to know that Lt. Colonel Morgan is anxious to know whether the representative of OIR for JICA in Algiers sends copies of his reports directly to OIR in Washington. The Collection Unit wishes to establish unequivocally what the channel through JICA Reception Center is or is not the sole channel by which JICA material comes into Washington in order to fix the degree of responsibility for distribution. I have informed Dr. Gilliam that our representative in Algiers does not transmit these reports directly and that we do receive these reports solely through the channel of JICA Collection Center.

IDS

cc to Gen. Donovan & Sheperdson
IDS/edc



Gen. Donovan:

4-27-43

.....
This has been done.



John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS — Intelligence Service
18636.

APR 24 1943

*Intelligence Service (AS) 11,385*OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.** Near East Reports
* Turkey*

April 23, 1943

MEMORANDUMFrom: General Donovan
To: General Magruder

In sending your weekly material to the Middle East, I think you should advise them of the German comment of the supposed attack in Turkey.

WJD

*Shaw's letter for
11. Excluded Cairo
cable - Will show
you copy then P.M.
S. Hannon*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General William J. Donovan DATE: April 21, 1943
FROM: Harold C. Deutsch *H.C. Deutsch*
SUBJECT: Report in the German Press on Supposed Mission to Turkey

I herewith transmit this interesting reference in a Kilgour cable on the chance that it has not yet been called to your attention.

Attachment

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Office of Strategic Services

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OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: April 10, 1948

TO The Director of Strategic Services
FROM Deputy Director, OSS -- Intelligence Service
SUBJECT Functions of IS.

OK Now Then
Bill Langer's fears are not justified; his suspicions are, if he means that an office has been set up as a mere symbol.

The fact that I have, so far, performed without assistants has probably been misleading. It was never my intention to carry on in lone splendor. Having explored the possibilities of the intelligence "service," I am convinced of its value--in fact of its necessity if the OSS is to carry its full weight in the intelligence field. Despite our magnificent personnel, and the individual capabilities of the three intelligence branches, the Intelligence Service as an integrated whole can be made very much more effective than its several parts. This can be accomplished only by the directed efforts of a small over-head group who think and plan actively and who coordinate the work of the several branches. If these are nonentities and supine, they are worse than useless. They are supposed not to content "themselves with anything like minor activities."

On the other hand, they will not be permitted to meddle with internal operations of the several branches. They intervene only where, from an over-all point of view, those operations require integration and coordination in order best to accomplish intelligence purposes you have in mind.

The chart I showed you is to be considered only in the light of a functional guide for my own thinking and that of my assistants. Every item included is either a normal intelligence function common to all three branches or is a continuing problem

-2-

involving the three branches and which cannot be solved by any branch chief acting alone. Sporadic meetings will not solve them. An assistant following them can.

The matter of whether you want three branches or an Intelligence Service is an important one. If you want a Service, there must be an over-all Deputy and some intelligent assistants. If this system be supported by you--and only if supported by you--OSS can produce intelligence results well beyond those now produced by three intelligence compartments. Your time can be saved and that of the three branch directors as well if we organize and work as a team.


John Magruder, Brig. Gen.
Deputy Director, OSS--Intelligence Service

I.S. 11,222

SECRET<Organization
x LangerOFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICESPERSONAL

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO General Donovan
FROM William L. Langer
SUBJECT

DATE. April 8, 1943

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10
General Magruder

I have studied with considerable care the projected setup for General Magruder's office, and have now sent this on to Whitney Shepardson who will return it to you.

As I look over this chart, I am impressed, first of all, with the fact that it provides for one Assistant to the Deputy Director of I.S. at P-8 and no less than four Directors at P-7. This is an extremely high-powered staff, and it is a little difficult to imagine these men contenting themselves with anything like minor activities.

If you look at the chart, you will see that the one word that recurs in almost every connection is the word "supervision" applied to almost every major activity of the existing three intelligence branches. To my mind supervision implies a very considerable measure of direction, and, of course, the idea of direction is implied also in the titles of these four men.

My viewpoint, and I think that of Shepardson, is simply this--the insertion of a new group, or office, between the heads of the branches and yourself would be little short of disastrous for the organization. What we have been striving for here, and rightly, I believe, is the closest possible connection between Branch Directors and yourself and the closest sort of cooperation between the Directors of the different branches. Both Shepardson and I derived from General Magruder the distinct impression that he intended to take an active part in the work of the three intelligence

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
General Donovan

-2-

April 8, 1943

branches. I think this will add greatly to the complexity of things, and, as a matter of fact, will not prove to be feasible. Each one of these branches is engaged in highly specialized work, as you know, and anything that interferes with the effective control within the branches is certainly to be deprecated. Personally, I do not see how we could function satisfactorily in the R&A Branch if every operation had to be submitted and cleared by some outside office.

I cannot tell you how highly I esteem General Magruder and how much we have appreciated in the R&A Branch the work he has done in coordinating general intelligence efforts and opening up sources of information especially of military nature. I think we have very real need of such a coordinating officer. I do not think we need any further direction in the conduct of operations. If General Magruder has the staff he outlines in this chart, that staff will want to do something, and I think we would very soon have constant and intensive interference with the activities of the intelligence branches.



William L. Langer
Director, Branch of
Research and Analysis

File.

General Donovan:

April 12, 1943

This is a draft memorandum to define the purposes and functions of the Division of Current Intelligence, now operating under McKay, within the R & A Branch.

It was done to clarify the minds of our own people and to be a clear-out explanation to the budget people of this essential activity.

Although organized within the R & A, you will see that this Division is responsible for handling current intelligence and "hot" information for all three branches. It is an overall activity for the Intelligence Service as a whole.

Note that its functions include the following:

1. Maintenance of the Psychological Warfare Room.
2. Preparation of Material for the II Weekly Summary.
3. Psychological Warfare Daily Summary.
4. The P. W. Intelligence Weekly.
5. Theatre area Reports and the Military Bulletin.
6. Special Preparation and Dissemination of current intelligence.

John Magruder

Brig. Gen. John Magruder,
Deputy Director, Intelligence Service

(4216)

This copy is for
your file.

Sey.

Shaw Director

FRANKLIN FRANCH

Division of Current Intelligence

100-443887-100

1. The general purpose of the Division of Current Intelligence shall be to secure, process, and disseminate promptly special types of current intelligence reports, especially those relating to psychological warfare.
2. It is proposed to maintain a clear distinction between current intelligence, and longer, critical analysis of information, on the assumption that a mechanism for the rapid reception and dissemination of current information is essential and has not previously existed in the Intelligence Services.
3. Such current intelligence reports from the three intelligence branches will be processed for the immediate use of the following groups:
 - (a) All personnel in OSS engaged in the planning and execution of the military program for psychological warfare, in accordance with General Order No. 9.
 - (b) For authorized individuals and agencies outside OSS, as instructed by the Director of the Office of Strategic Services.
4. The Division of Current Intelligence is less a new function than a reorganization of existing personnel, and a consolidation of activities already being performed and provided for in the budget.

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II. Area of Activity.

1. The Division of Current Intelligence is concerned as having solely the function of securing, editing, and disseminating current intelligence. If research is required for the evaluation of such intelligence, the Division of Current Intelligence will depend upon other divisions of the G. and A. branch for this service, particularly upon the Sub-Division for Psychological Warfare.

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2. Since the Division of Current Intelligence will concern itself exclusively with the processing of the latest current information, no system for deposit, no library, and no extensive files are envisaged. After processing in the Division all documentary and other materials shall be returned promptly to C.I.I. or to other sources.

III. Organization of Functions

In order to achieve its purpose the Division of Current Information shall be organized in terms of the following specific functions:

1. Maintenance of the Psychological Warfare Room

(a) The Division of Current Intelligence shall be responsible for the maintenance of the Psychological Warfare Room as the center for the reception, processing, and dissemination of current intelligence.

(b) This room shall be the temporary repository and distribution point for all current intelligence which is required by the Division for purposes of editing and dissemination. The Intake Desk shall regulate the routing of the current intelligence received in the room in such fashion that the several deadlines are met and the information appropriately distributed.

(c) In addition to being a clearing-house for current intelligence, the Psychological Warfare Room is designed to provide all those members of OSS who are concerned with the planning and execution of psychological warfare with an over-all picture, and a current analysis of psychological warfare as it is actually being waged.

(d) The materials processed or temporarily displayed in the P. W. Room shall consist of all available, current information which can assist the Division in achieving its objectives. In the main, such materials will be of two kinds. First, documentary materials originating either within OSS or outside, as for example OSS official dispatches, reports and memoranda from the several branches of OSS, R. and A. reports on the current theatres of psychological warfare; as well as intelligence from Army, Navy, and State Department sources etc. Secondly, current information in the form of maps, charts, graphs, and visual presentation projects.

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(e) These materials will ordinarily be provided by the other branches of the Intelligence Service.

2. Preparation of Material for the JIC Weekly Summary.

The Division shall prepare and edit each week's current intelligence for incorporation into the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Weekly Summary. In this task the Division shall have the assistance of appropriate research specialists in the S. and A. Branch.

3. Psychological Warfare Daily Summary.

(a) The staff of the Division of Current Intelligence shall be responsible for the preparation of a factual daily summary of intelligence items from all available sources which bear on psychological warfare.

(b) The primary purpose of the Daily Summary is to provide the Planning Group and Planning Staff for Psychological Warfare (OSW) with a maximum coverage of significant information on the current situation from all sources.

(c) A secondary purpose is to provide a continuing record of the situation in the several theatres of psychological warfare in order that at recurring intervals these situations may be surveyed more fully in the light of developments of the recent past.

(d) The Summary, which shall be mimeographed, is intended for limited circulation within OSW, to Branch and Division Heads, to the members of the P. W. Planning Group, and Planning Staff, and to others properly concerned with psychological warfare. The summary shall be classified as secret.

4. The P. W. Intelligence Weekly.

(a) In addition to a factual daily summary of intelligence, the staff of this Division shall edit and disseminate a weekly secret bulletin of intelligence for psychological warfare for a limited distribution.

(b) The P. W. Intelligence Weekly will differ from the Daily Summary not only in size and distribution, but in the interpretative treatment of the material incorporated in it.

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(c) The primary purpose is to furnish a weekly, overall analysis of our own, and especially of, enemy psychological warfare, for use not only of GSW personnel, but of other agencies engaged in psychological warfare.

(d) Secondly, it is designed to acquaint the research personnel of GSW with the various aspects of psychological warfare through analyses of enemy activities thus ensuring a useful and rapid orientation of R. and I. research personnel for psychological warfare.

(e) The content of this publication will include (1) a summary of the week's activity on the psychological warfare front, (2) a critical analysis of the most significant changes in enemy P. W. activities, (3) studies of air, weapons, and procedures of current enemy P. W. operations, (4) surveys of various countries and situations as background for U. S. psychological warfare activities, (5) discussion of enemy vulnerabilities which can be effectively exploited by our psychological warfare efforts, (6) a critique of books, articles, and other materials explaining the recent development and current techniques of psychological warfare, especially of the Axis countries.

3. Theatre Oral Reports and the Military Bulletin.

(a) In view of the necessity of a close integration of psychological warfare plans with actual military and naval operations, the Division of Current Intelligence will provide bi-weekly theatre reports, to be given orally in the Psychological Warfare Room.

(b) It will be the function of the theatre reporters to secure from appropriate sources such current intelligence on enemy activities as may be necessary for presenting brief reports on the progress of the war in the active and potentially active theatres.

(c) The theatre reporters shall be assisted in their functions by the member of the Division of Current Intelligence who is responsible for the maintenance of maps, charts, graphs, and visual presentation projects.

(d) The theatre reporters are also charged with the preparation at intervals of a brief mimeographed

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

bulletin summarizing and interpreting the military developments as background for planning psychological warfare. This shall be classified as secret and its circulation shall be limited to OSS.

5. Special Preparation and Dissemination.

(a) It shall also be a function of the Division of Current Intelligence to supervise and effect the dissemination of current intelligence processed in OSS to such persons and agencies as should properly receive it.

(b) It shall also effect any special preparation and dissemination of particular current information as directed by the Director.

(c) A special Summary of Current Intelligence coming from OSS sources shall be prepared at intervals for use in the White House Map Room.

(d) Cables of information shall be prepared, at intervals, for the use of OSS outposts abroad. These cables shall be designed to furnish information affecting OSS activities in theatres abroad.

IV. Organization of Personnel

A. Chief of the Division.

1. The chief of the Division shall have the power to determine the policies of the Division as a whole. He shall have general responsibility for the efficient discharge of all the functions of the Division, and shall represent it in all negotiations with other divisions of R. and A.

2. He shall have specific charge of the Psychological Warfare Room, and special responsibility for the intake of intelligence materials, their rapid routing through the Division, and for their dissemination after processing.

B. The Editors of the Psychological Warfare Daily Summary.

CONFIDENTIAL

An editor and an assistant editor of the Division shall be charged with the function of preparing and dissemination of the P. W. Weekly Summary.

C. The Editors of the P. W. Intelligence Weekly:

An editor and an assistant editor of the staff of the Division shall be charged with the general supervision and editing of the P. W. Intelligence Weekly.

D. Maintenance of the P. W. Room:

1. A number and one assistant of the staff of the Division reinforced by such personnel as may be afforded, shall be held responsible for the maintenance of the maps, charts, graphs, and visual presentation exhibits in the Psychological Warfare Room.

2. They shall be assisted by a competent cartographer, either full or part time, provided by the Map Division of R. and A.

E. Theatre Reporters:

1. The number of theatre reporters shall be three, one each for the Russian, North African-Eastern European, and Far Eastern Theatres.

2. Since the functions of the theatre reporters is not likely for the present to require the full time of three members of the staff, they shall be charged with other functions within the division in addition to their duties as theatre reporters.

F. Special Preparation and Dissemination:

1. The functions of special dissemination of intelligence, including the preparation of material for the J.I.C. Weekly Summary, the Special Summary for the P. W. House War Room, the Military Bulletin, the intelligence cables shall in each case be the responsibility of one member of the staff of the Division. But the preparation of material for special dissemination shall be accomplished by cooperation between the various members of the staff at the direction of the Division Chief.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 7 -

3. Administrative, Secretarial and Stenographic Personnel.

1. Junior Administrative Assistant (1)

The Junior Administrative Assistant shall be charged with responsibility for distribution of all intelligence materials which are received in the Psychological Warfare Room. She shall also arrange for the routing of these materials to the various desks for processing, and, finally, shall be responsible for arranging for an efficient exchange of items of intelligence between the various members of the staff.

2. Clerk Stenographers (2)

(Statement of duties to be added)

S E 9.
S. F. Gleason, Jr.
April 10, 1943